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I. INTRODUCTION
Business entities have become increasingly inclined in recent years to institute litigation as a means of vindicating corporate reputation or economic interests when false statements
have been made about their products, services, or commercial
activities.1 In these suits, business plaintiffs have relied primarily on defamation law, under which protection of reputation
is the paramount concern. 2 They have also invoked injurious
falsehood law, which addresses false statements that damage
economic interests but do not harm corporate reputation.3
Defamation and injurious falsehood share a fundamental
attribute: both impose liability for the consequences of written
1. See Milo Geyelin, CorporateMudslinging Gets Expensive, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1989, at B1.
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1586 (1991); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue
Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58
(1990); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986).
3. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 962-63; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS §§ 623A & cmt. g, at 633 (1977). Among the most common injurious
falsehood claims are those based on allegedly false statements that disparage a
company's product or service. Such "disparagement" actions rest on the premise that the defendant's falsehood harmed plaintiffs economic interest in the
sale of its product or service. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 491 n.7 (1984); Unelko Corp., 912 F.2d at
1051-52; Angio-Medical Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 720 F. Supp. 269,271 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Everett, 600 A.2d 398 (Me. 1991); J.Q. Office
Equip. of Omaha, Inc. v. Sullivan, 432 N.W.2d 211 (Neb. 1988). For a more
detailed discussion of injurious falsehood claims and the economic interests
that may give rise to them, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial Speech, and Unfair
Competition Considerationsin the Law of InjuriousFalsehood,62 TEmp. L. REv.
903, 913-23 (1989).
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or spoken expression. As a result of this focus on expression,
these common law doctrines may be at cross-purposes with the
First Amendment 4 guarantees of freedom of speech and press.5
Although courts long seemed oblivious to the First Amendment
implications of these doctrines, 6 the past three decades have
witnessed judicial development of various proof requirements
designed to reconcile defamation and injurious falsehood law
7
with the First Amendment.
Federal law, most notably the recently amended section
43(a) of the Lanham Act,8 also contemplates liability for makers
of certain false statements about products, services, or other
commercial matters. Even before Congress amended it, commentators had come to view section 43(a) as a versatile provision whose various potential uses included providing a basis for
commercial plaintiffs' false advertising claims against other
business entities. 9 The present version of section 43(a), how4. First Amendment rights of free speech and a free press of course have
not been violated unless government action restricted speech or press. U.S.
CONsT. amend. I. Judicial enforcement of rules of law that adversely affect
rights of expression provides sufficient government action to trigger First
Amendment analysis. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
265 (1968). The Fourteenth Amendment restricts certain actions by state governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Courts have consistently interpreted the
latter amendment's guarantee of due process rights as encompassing the protections afforded by the First Amendment. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925). Thus, Courts view the First and Fourteenth Amendments as
extending the same freedom of expression rights. Id. For purposes of convenience, this article will generally refer to "the First Amendment," or to "First
Amendment" rights or guarantees, even when a reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment would be technically accurate.
5. See, e.g., Bose Corp. 466 U.S. at 503-11; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times, 376 U.S. 254. The Supreme Court has recognized that in order to further First Amendment rights to engage in truthful
expression, it may sometimes be necessary to allow defendants to escape liability for certain false statements. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41; New York Times, 376
U.S. at 271-72. For additional discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of
freedom of expression interests in defamation and injurious falsehood cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 154-289.
6. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
7. The "constitutionalization" of defamation law began in 1964 with New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For discussion of New York
Times and its progeny, see infra text accompanying notes 154-207.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The amendment to § 43(a) took effect on
Nov. 16, 1989. Id. Although the Lanham Act, id. at §§ 1051-1128, deals primarily with trademark rights, § 43(a) is a versatile provision that may be applied both inside and outside the trademark rights setting. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-79.
9. See generally Arthur Best, Monetary Damagesfor FalseAdvertising, 49
U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1987) (discussing § 43(a) as a vehicle for false advertising
claims); Lillian R. BeVier, CompetitorSuits for FalseAdvertising Under Section
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ever, sweeps even more broadly. In the false advertising context, the defendant's false statements violated "old" section 43(a)
only when made about the defendant's goods or services. 10 The
"new" section 43(a) not only allows for liability in this situation,
but also makes actionable certain false or misleading statements by the defendant regarding the plaintiffs "goods, services, or commercial activities,"" when 12made in the context of
"commercial advertising or promotion."
The amendment is significant because many business related suits over falsehoods, formerly actionable only on common
law defamation or injurious falsehood grounds because they involved the defendant's statements about the plaintiff or the
plaintiffs economic interests, may now be statutory causes of action. 13 Assume, for illustrative purposes, that in an advertisement for the aspirin it manufactures, XYZ Corp. alleges that
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1
(1992) (same); Ross D. Petty, Supplanting Government Regulation With CompetitorLawsuits: The Case of ControllingFalseAdvertising, 25 IND. L. REv. 351
(1991) (same); Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle:
Some Reactions to ProfessorBeVier, 78 VA. L. REv. 57 (1992) (same). For fur-

ther discussion of this use of § 43(a), see infra text accompanying notes 26-43,
65-80.
10. The former version of § 43(a) prohibited the use, in connection with the
providing of goods or services, of "false designation[s] of origin," and "any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely
to describe or represent the same." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Courts consistently interpreted this language as contemplating liability only when the defendant's designations, descriptions, or
representations pertained to the defendant's own product or service. E.g., Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). In amending § 43(a), Congress overturned this interpretation. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-.N. 5577, 5603.
11. The present version of § 43(a) provides liability when the defendant, "in
commercial advertising or promotion," makes false or misleading representations regarding the "nature, characteristics, [or] qualities ... of his or her or
anotherperson's goods, services, or commercial activities." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1988) (emphasis added). The plaintiff would logically be "another person" for
purposes of the statute. See S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-.AN. 5577, 5603.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
13. Not all defamation and injurious falsehood claims fall within the new
§ 43(a)'s scope, however, given the statute's "commercial advertising or promotion" limitation. See id; see also Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F.
Supp. 130, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (criticism of another's product by one not
engaged in providing goods or services falls outside "commercial advertising or
promotion" section of statute and is actionable, if at all, only on defamation
grounds). For additional discussion of defamation and injurious falsehood
claims not covered by the new § 43(a), see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text.
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ABC Co.'s non-aspirin pain reliever causes certain harmful side
effects which ABC has concealed from the public. Also assume
that ABC regards this allegation as untrue and therefore plans

to sue XYZ. 1 4 ABC may find a suit under the new section 43(a)

more desirable than traditional defamation or injurious falsehood claims, 15 because the latter impose stern proof requirements that section 43(a) does not by its terms mandate. 16
Although the new section 43(a) is of fairly recent vintage, there
are already signs that business plaintiffs will seek to employ the
statute as a vehicle for bypassing these "troublesome" requirements by recasting what formerly would have been a defamation
7
or injurious falsehood claim as a section 43(a) claim.'
This may seem innocuous enough at first glance. After all,
if Congress or a state legislature enacts a statute that liberalizes
a strict common law rule, plaintiffs are entitled to take advantage of the liberalization. Replacing the common law causes of
action with a section 43(a) cause of action raises a significant
problem, however. Some of the stern defamation and injurious
falsehood requirements that plaintiffs might evade by filing suit
under the new section 43(a) are not mere common law rules. Instead, they are constitutional rules which courts have imposed
in an effort to be faithful to the First Amendment.18 The ques14. This hypothetical does not strain the imagination; competing pain reliever manufacturers have staged various false advertising battles under
§ 43(a). See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d
1544 (2d Cir. 1991); McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1988); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d
160 (2d Cir. 1978).
15. The "side effects" allegation adversely portrays the would-be plaintiffs
goods, as do some statements giving rise to injurious falsehood claims. The concealment allegation is one of the improper commercial activities-the sort of
allegation that may trigger a defamation claim. See infra text accompanying
notes 101-144.
16. These stern requirements include fault elements among others. See infra text accompanying notes 116-124, 159-186, 199-220. Section 43(a), however,
appears to contemplate a strict liability regime. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988)
(no mention of fault requirement of sorts found in defamation and injurious
falsehood). See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
17. See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., 938 F.2d 1544; Nat'l Artists Management Co.
v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier
Med. Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991); Janda v. Riley-Meggs Indus., 764
F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,
744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
18. See discussion supra note 5 and accompanying text. This is particularly true of defamation, where the Supreme Court has crafted various First
Amendment-based rules. See infra text accompanying notes 154-276. The
Court has been less explicit regarding the First Amendment aspects of injurious falsehood, although it has strongly hinted that freedom of expression con-
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tion then becomes whether constitutionally mandated elements
of defamation and injurious falsehood may be evaded by the simple expedient of bringing suit under section 43(a), or whether
courts should stop this end-run by imposing First Amendmentbased proof requirements on plaintiffs in section 43(a) suits that
are disguised "defamation" or "injurious falsehood" claims. So
far, courts deciding cases under the new section 43(a) have
either avoided this troublesome question or answered it unsatisfactorily. 19 This article takes up the question and offers a
framework to reconcile section 43(a) with the First Amendment.
Section II provides essential background on section 43(a)
and its use in the context of commercial falsehood. Section III
discusses defamation and injurious falsehood claims, the traditional avenues of judicial recourse for speech-caused harm to
corporate reputational and economic interests. Section IV focuses on the "constitutionalization" that has recently dominated
defamation law, and to a lesser extent, injurious falsehood law.
In addition, Section IV examines the development and status of
the public concern doctrine, which, despite its lack of clarity, has
become a mainstay of First Amendment jurisprudence. Section
V sets out the commercial speech doctrine. Although applied
outside the defamation and injurious falsehood contexts, this
doctrine bears certain features that aid a proper resolution of
the section 43(a) issues considered here.
After Section VI explores the inadequate judicial treatment
of the freedom of expression implications of section 43(a) "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" cases, Section VII explains
why courts must develop First Amendment-based proof requirements for such cases. Section VII then focuses on the proper
cerns must be accommodated in injurious falsehood cases. See Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). For additional
discussion of Bose and the probable constitutional components of injurious
falsehood, see infra text accompanying notes 268-287. Some of the other stern
aspects of injurious falsehood have long existed as common law elements of the
tort. See infra text accompanying notes 116-124.
19. Courts have avoided or ignored the question in several cases. See McNeil-P.C.C., 938 F.2d 1544; ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d
958 (D.C. Cir. 1990); American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Nat'l Artists Management, 769
F. Supp. 1224; Janda,764 F. Supp. 1223; Weight Watchers Int'l, F. Supp. 1259.
Other courts have unsatisfactorily dealt with the issue. See U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 930-39 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 58 (1990); Energy Four,765 F. Supp. at 733. For discussion of
U.S. Healthcareand Energy Four, see infra text accompanying notes 350-394.
Congress erroneously thought that it avoided creating First Amendment
problems when it amended § 43(a). See infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
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content of those requirements. The article rejects, as unsatisfactory, the uncomplicated solution of judicially engrafing upon
section 43(a) the same First Amendment-based scheme imposed
on the common law of defamation. Instead, the article proposes
different constitutional rules, which, given the commercial context of section 43(a) cases, more suitably strike the balance between plaintiffs' economic and reputational interests and
defendants' contrasting expressive interests.
II. SECTION 43(a): AN EVOLVING
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Lanham Act's 20 provisions deal mostly with federally

registered trademarks, governing registration, the rights acquired by a registered mark's owner, and the infringement of
registered marks. 2 1 Since its enactment in 1946, however, the
Lanham Act has also contained a provision, section 43(a), the
language of which invites application outside the registered
mark setting.
A.

THE "OLD" SECTION

43(a)

Prior to November 16,
nent part, as follows:

1989,22

section 43(a) read, in perti-

Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce,
... shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the
locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said
locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988).
21. See id. §§ 1052-53 (registration of trademarks and service marks on
Principal Register), 1065 (incontestability of mark after five years of registration on Principal Register), 1072 (registration on Principal Register providing
nationwide constructive notice of ownership), 1114 (infringement). For more
detailed discussion of trademark rights and infringement suits under the Lanham Act, state statutes, and the common law, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amendment
Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VIL. L. REv. 1, 7-39 (1991).
22. The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 ('TLRA"), which amended
various Lanham Act provisions, took effect on November 16, 1989. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988). The amended provisions included Section 43(a).
Id. § 1125(a). This article's periodic references to the "old" § 43(a) and the
"new" § 43(a) refer, respectively, to the pre-TLRA version and post-TLRA versions of the statute.
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23

representation.

Because of the statute's references to "any goods or services," "a
false designation of origin," and any "false description or representation," and the lack of an express limitation to registered
marks, courts consistently viewed the former section 43(a) as
authorizing infringement claims regarding unregistered, as well
as registered, marks. 24 Early interpretations concluded that
section 43(a) also encompassed tort claims for "passing off,"
when the defendant makes representations or engages in conduct designed to have the2 5 public mistake the defendant's goods
for those of the plaintiff.
Not until the mid-1950s, however, did courts interpret section 43(a) in a way that exploited the possibilities inherent in
the broad statutory language. In L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana
Lobell, Inc.,2 6 the plaintiff dress manufacturer alleged, in essence, that the defendant's advertisement falsely represented
the quality and appearance of a dress which the defendant sold
at retail. After the district court's dismissal for failure to state a
legal claim, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, approving a commercial party's use of section 43(a) to obtain relief for
another's false advertising.27 The significance of the Third Circuit's treatment of section 43(a) lies in its holding that section
false advertising even if it did
43(a) could be used to challenge
28
off."
"passing
involve
not
For a number of years after L'Aiglon, however, commercial
plaintiffs only rarely filed false advertising suits based on section 43(a). Beginning in the late 1970s, the raising of false advertising claims under section 43(a) ceased to be a novel use of
the statute. 2 9 The past fifteen years have witnessed numerous
23. Id. § 1125(a).
24. See id. (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); Joseph P. Bauer,
A FederalLaw of Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv.671, 685-86 & nn.61-64 (1984) (dis-

cussing use of § 43(a) as basis for infringement suits involving unregistered
marks).
25. E.g., Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, 193 F.2d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.
1951); Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D.
Mass. 1949), affd, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curium).
26. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
27. Id. at 650.
28. Id. at 651. Noting that some courts had read a passing off limitation
into section 43(a), the Third Circuit preferred not to do so in the absence of
statutory language suggesting the appropriateness of such a limitation. Id.
29. See Bauer, supra note 24, at 691-92 (discussing current prevalence of
false advertising litigation under § 43(a)); BeVier, supra note 9, at 1-3 (same);
Petty, supra note 9, at 351-52 (same).
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section 43(a) cases involving allegedly untrue advertising claims
about, for example, pain relievers' effectiveness, performance capabilities and side effects.3 0 Other such cases alleged false promotional pitches for products that run the gamut from orange
juice to shampoo to dog food to rental trucks. 3 1 Whether
prompted by a desire to preserve or develop market share,3 2 the
advent of large damages awards,3 3 or some other factor, 34 com30. E.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d
Cir. 1991); McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1988); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d
Cir. 1978).
31. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982)
(orange juice); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1981) (shampoo); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (dog food); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir.
1986) (rental trucks).
32. The ongoing saga of suits involving producers of pain relievers, see, e.g.,
supra note 30 (citing cases), suggests that such a motivation may be at work.
See also BeVier, supra note 9, at 24-25 n.70 (describing the pain reliever cases
as a "seemingly endless stream"). According to the Second Circuit, "[tihe competitive battlefield has shifted from the shelves of supermarkets and drugstores
to the courtroom." McNeilab, Inc., 848 F.2d at 35 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. E.g., U-Haul Int'l, 793 F.2d at 1035-36 (affirming $40 million award to
U-Haul); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 778 F.Supp. 555 (D.D.C.),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 997 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ($12.1 million award).
It should be noted that the large awards in U-Haul andALPO are atypical. See,
e.g., infra note 53 (citing cases).
With regard to remedies, § 35(a) of the Lanham Act authorizes both injunctive relief and damages, including an award of the defendant's profits (attributable to the behavior violating § 43(a)) in appropriate cases. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(1988). Courts often require the plaintiff to demonstrate willfulness or bad
faith on the part of the defendant as a prerequisite to recovery of the defendant's profits. E.g., ALPO Petfoods v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 961, 968
(D.C. Cir. 1990). In addition, § 35(a) grants courts the discretion to increase
damage awards up to three times the amount of actual proven damages, so long
as the increase is compensatory rather than punitive in nature. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a). See ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d at 969-70 (discussing such exercises of
judicial discretion). Attorney's fees may also be awarded in exceptional cases,
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), such as when the losing party acted in bad faith. ALPO,
913 F.2d at 961. Prior to the TLRA's amendments to the Lanham Act, § 35(a)'s
monetary remedies expressly extended only to cases involving infringement of
registered trademarks and service marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1982), amended
by 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988). Courts generally concluded, however, that such
remedies were nonetheless available in § 43(a) cases as well. See, e.g., U-Haul
Int'l, 793 F.2d at 1042. Congress legislatively affirmed that conclusion in the
enactment of the TLRA by expressly making all of§ 35(a)'s remedies applicable
to § 43(a) cases. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988). For additional discussion of what
the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain injunctive and monetary relief, see
infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
34. In theory, the desire to promote consumer welfare might provide a motivating factor. Even though commercial parties (rather than consumers) are
proper § 43(a) plaintiffs, see infra note 35, protecting consumers from confusion
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mercial plaintiffs' resort to section 43(a) as a private remedy for
3 5 has emerged as a commonplace use of the
false advertising
36
statute.
Another notable aspect of false advertising claims under the
previous version of section 43(a) was the statute's strict liability
regime. 3 7 The old section 43(a) contained no knowledge component or "fault" requirement 3 8 of the sort encountered in defamaor deception is considered a major purpose underlying § 43(a), BeVier, supra
note 9, at 16. It does not seem too cynical to assert, however, that such motivations are clearly secondary to § 43(a) plaintiffs' desires to safeguard their own
economic interests. See id. at 16-18.
35. Courts have generally concluded that commercial plaintiffs may invoke
§ 43(a) but that consumer plaintiffs may not. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities
Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In
order to have standing in a given case, the commercial plaintiff mst be a party
that "is or is likely to be damaged" by the defendant's statements or conduct. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (superseded version
containing same quoted language). Because both contain the same "is or is
likely to be damaged" language, it is likely that courts will continue to follow
their prior interpretations denying consumer standing. For discussion of
whether consumers should be allowed to sue under § 43(a), see Scott E. Thompson, Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a): More Legislative History, More
Confusion, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 341 (1989).
36. See Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription
DrugAdvertising: LitigatingFalse Scientific Establishment Claims Under the
Lanham Act, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 389, 394, 408-09 (1992). Section 43(a) of
course remains available for various purposes other than attacking false advertising. As noted earlier, plaintiffs may bring trademark infringement cases and
passing off claims under § 43(a). See discussion supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recently decided a § 43(a) case involving alleged trade dress infringement by one restaurant against another. Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992). Other recent cases demonstrating the versatility of § 43(a) include those in which the plaintiff claimed
that his or her right of publicity was violated. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1989); Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
37. BeVier, supra note 9, at 30-31; Sherry Gunn, Note, Lanham Act Revision Provides Relief for Misleading Comparative Advertisements: Does It Go
Too Far?,68 WASH. U. L.Q. 707, 721-22 (1990); Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note,
The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Standards Governing the Regulation of False
Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the LanhamAct, 77 VA. L. REv. 339, 341-42
(1991).
38. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (no statutory language requiring knowledge of falsity, negligent failure to ascertain truth, or similar fault requirement), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The former version of§ 43(a) did
contain a provision indicating that a mere transporter of goods bearing a false
designation or representation could not be held liable under the statute unless
the transporter had knowledge of the falsity. Id. That narrow provision obviously distinguished between makers of false representations and mere transporters of goods bearing false designations or representations, and applied the
knowledge component as an element of proof only in a claim against a transporter. See id. The statement in this Article's text regarding a lack of a fault
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tion law, where the defendant's knowing, reckless, or negligent
falsehoods furnish the basis of the plaintiffs claim.3 9 A defendant found to have made false representations about its product
or service faced liability under the old section 43(a) to an appropriate plaintiff, regardless of whether the defendant knew or
had reason to know of the representations' falsity.40 In other
words, even if the defendant had a good-faith belief that the representations were true, their falsity nonetheless made the defendant liable. The language of the present 4 1section 43(a)
apparently maintains this strict liability regime.
Consistent judicial interpretations of the old section 43(a)
limited its applicability to false advertising cases in which the
defendant's false representations referred to the defendant's
own goods or services. The defendant's false assertions about
the plaintiffs products or business activities were not actionable
under the statute. 4 2 The new, significantly broader section
43(a) repudiates this constraint and thus fulfills a major congressional objective underlying the amended version of section
43
43(a).

B. THE "NEW" SECTION 43(A)
On November 16, 1989, the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988 (TLRA),44 the first significant revision of the Lanham Act
since its enactment, took effect. Although the TLRA did not create an entirely new statutory scheme, it revised various provisions and substantially altered certain fundamental aspects of
requirement is intended to mean that in run-of-the-mill § 43(a) false advertising claims-those against the alleged makers of false representations-courts
did not require plaintiffs to prove fault.
39. For detailed discussion of the fault requirements in different configurations of defamation cases, see infra text accompanying notes 159-254.
40. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l, Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D.
IMI. 1974). For discussion of what courts have traditionally required of plaintiffs
in order to grant injunctive and monetary relief in § 43(a) false advertising
cases, see infra notes 52-53.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Of course, the absence of language creating a fault requirement in § 43(a) cases does not end the constitutional inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 85-100.
42. E.g., Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). This meant that statements about
the plaintiffs product, service, or business were actionable, if at all, only under
the common law of defamation and injurious falsehood. See infra text accompanying notes 101-145.
43. S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1988).
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trademark law.4 5 In addition, the TLRA included the new ver-

sion of section 43(a), which provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person4 6who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.

Analysis of this new section reveals that it is quite similar to, yet
markedly different from, its predecessor. Most of the similarities appear inthe new section 43(a)'s introductory and concluding language, as well as in subsection (1). The present version's
subsection (2), discussed below, provides the major area of
difference.
1. Introductory Language, Concluding Language, and
Subsection (1): Minimal Change
Certain provisions of section 43(a) survived the amendment
process. Analysis of these similarities should begin by examining the enforcement mechanism the statute's concluding language sets forth. In authorizing civil suits by "any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged" by an act or
statement prohibited by the statute, the new section 43(a) uses
47
language that is virtually identical to the former version.
Thus, it is logical to assume that courts will perpetuate the
"commercial plaintiffs only" construction given to the old section
43(a).48 Not surprisingly, early cases under the new statute
have largely been limited to such plaintiffs. 49 In addition, the
45. For an overview of the TLRA's major effects (other than its modification of § 43(a)) on federal trademark law, see Marianne Lavelle, What's in a
Name? New Law Explains, NAT'L L.J., March 6, 1989, at 1, 50.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
47. Compare id. ("any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged") with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (same language in previous version,
except for words "or she").
48. For discussion of the prevailing judicial view that only commercial parties and not consumers may bring § 43(a) claims, see supra note 35.
49. E.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.
1992); McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir.
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continued presence of the same "likely to be damaged" language 50 probably means-to the dismay of some commentators5 1-that courts will maintain their previous approaches to
granting injunctions 52 and awarding damages and other mone1991); W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Totes Inc., 788 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del.
1992); Nat'l Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991);
Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
50. See supra note 47.
51. Various commentators have devoted considerable attention to discussion, analysis, and criticism of the remedies for violations of § 43(a). See, e.g.,
Best, supra note 9; BeVier, supra note 9; Paul D. Frederickson, Recovery for
FalseAdvertising Under the Revised Lanham Act: A Methodology for the Computation of Damages,29 AM. Bus. L.J. 585 (1992); Paul Heald, Monetary Damages and CorrectiveAdvertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 629
(1988); Petty, supra note 9; Schechter, supra note 9; Singdahlsen, supra note
37; Garrett J. Waltzer, Monetary Relief for False Advertising Claims Arising
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1987).
Professor BeVier, for instance, criticizes the approach courts take to granting of injunctions in § 43(a) false advertising cases. BeVier, supra note 9, at 2730. She contends that courts too readily presume likelihood of harm in false
advertising cases, make it too easy for plaintiffs to prove likely injury when it is
not presumed, pay insufficient attention to the requirement that the defendant's statement pertained to a material matter, and too lightly assume the
existence of a causal connection between the alleged falsehood and the plaintiffs probable harm. Id. Professor Schechter, however, disagrees with Professor BeVier's view that courts often are too easy on plaintiffs in § 43(a) false
advertising cases. See Schechter, supra note 9, at 63. As for dissatisfaction
with the prevailing approaches to awards of monetary remedies under § 43(a),
compare Frederickson, supra, at 602-04 (contending that new method of damage calculation is necessary because prevailing rules are too restrictive of plaintiffs' ability to recover) with Singdahlsen, supra note 37, at 364-65, 393-94
(some courts' apparent liberalization of damages rules amount to undesirable
policy). See also Best, supra note 9; Heald, supra (proposing different measure
of damages for false advertising cases). For additional discussion of what plaintiffs must prove in order to obtain injunctive relief and monetary recovery in
§ 43(a) cases, see infra notes 52-53.
52. To obtain an injunction in a § 43(a) false advertising case, the plaintiff
must normally prove that the defendant's false statements about material product or service-related matters actually deceived, or had a tendency to deceive, a
significant portion of the defendant's audience. E.g., Skil Corp. v. Rockwell
Int'l, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The plaintiff must also prove
that it was therefore likely to be damaged in some economic sense, such as loss
of sales. Id. Proof of actual-rather than merely likely-economic harm is necessary only if the plaintiff seeks damages. Id. The notion of likelihood of harm
comes from § 43(a)'s language, which, in both its present and former incarnations, speaks of a plaintiff "lkely to be damaged." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982),
amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). When a plaintiff seeks an injunction,
courts effectively presume the requisite likelihood of harm if the defendant's
advertisement compared the plaintiffs and defendant's products or services.
Petty, supra note 9, at 371; BeVier, supra note 9, at 28-29. When the advertisement was not of a comparative nature, the plaintiff proves likelihood of harm by
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53
tary relief.

establishing the existence of a competitive relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant. Petty, supra note 9, at 371; BeVier, supra note 9, at 28-29.
53. Plaintiffs in § 43(a) cases normally seek injunctive relief but have recently also more aggressively sought damages. See BeVier, supra note 9, at 1,
26. In order to recover damages, plaintiffs must prove actual harm of an economic nature. Skil Corp., 375 F. Supp. at 783. Ordinarily, this rule requires
the plaintiff to prove lost sales traceable to the defendant's falsehood. E.g.,
Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312, 316-17 (2d Cir. 1982); Johnson
& Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). Doing so
sometimes presents a considerable obstacle for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Can-Am
Eng'g Co. v. Henderson Glass, Inc., 814 F.2d 253, 257-58 (6th Cir. 1987); Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 607 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Petty, supra
note 9, at 372 (commenting on the difficulty of proving lost sales).
Some courts, however, allow greater flexibility regarding proof of damages.
For instance, in U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir.
1986), the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to recover damages for the $13.6
million expense U-Haul incurred for an advertising campaign designed to correct the erroneous statements made in its competitor's advertisements. UHaul's total recovery amounted to $40 million, which reflected the $13.6 million
just noted, an award of the defendant's attributable profits, and the court's discretionary doubling of the amounts proven. Id. at 1037, 1042. The court held
the defendant Jartran, Inc.'s advertisements to be deliberate attempts at consumer deception. Id. at 1041, 1044. According to the court, this fact justified
not only an award of profits to U-Haul but also a presumption that the advertisements actually deceived customers. Id. at 1041. This supposed deception
evidently warranted U-Haul's attempts to correct the record by way of advertisements, the cost of which constituted recoverable items of damages. See id.
In ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 212-16
(D.D.C. 1989), vacated and remanded as to remedies, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.
1990), the district court initially awarded ALPO $10.4 million as a result of
Ralston Purina's false advertisements indicating that its dog food would reduce
the severity of canine hip dysplasia. The court arrived at this amount by doubling the $5.2 million spent by Ralston Purina on the advertising campaign.
ALPO Petfoods, 720 F. Supp. at 215. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and
remanded as to the damages issue. ALPO Petfoods, 913 F.2d at 967-970. It
held that the award to ALPO actually constituted an award of Ralston Purina's
profits, which was improper without a finding that Ralston Purina had acted
with willfulness or in bad faith. Id. at 967-68. The appellate court held, however, that recoverable damages could include:
profits lost by the plaintiff on sales actually diverted to the false advertiser,... profits lost by the plaintiff on sales made at prices reduced as
a demonstrated result of the false advertising,... the costs of any completed advertising that actually and reasonably responds to the defendant's offending ads,... and... quantifiable harm to the plaintiffs
good will, to the extent that completed corrective advertising has not
repaired that harm.
Id. at 969 (citations omitted). This approach clearly does not restrict false advertising plaintiffs to recovery for proven lost sales.
On remand, the district court awarded ALPO $12.1 million in damages.
ALPO Petfoods, 778 F. Supp. 555, 566 (D.D.C. 1991), affd in part,rev'd in part,
997 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1993). None of that amount represented lost profits,
because the court concluded that ALPO had notladequately demonstrated lost
profits. Id. at 560-61. The $12.1 million award included an allowance of ap-
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Civil claims under the new section 43(a) arise from a variety
of acts or statements. The statute's introductory language proscribes the use, in connection with goods, services, or containers
for goods, of "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof' that meets either of the tests set forth in
subsections (1) and (2).5 4 The introductory language also prohibits "false designation[s] of origin, false or misleading description[s] of fact, or false or misleading representation[s] of fact," if
their use meets either subsection's test. 55 The old section 43(a)
prohibited "false" designations, descriptions and representations, but neither mentioned "misleading" statements nor expressly required that statements be "of fact" in order to be
actionable. 5 6 The new section 43(a)'s inclusion of these references should not result in significant changes, however. Common judicial interpretations of the previous version held that it
also proscribed misleading statements, 57 and that offending
proximately $3.5 million for advertising and promotional expenses that ALPO
appropriated as a result of Ralston Purina's false claims that its puppy food
would help prevent canine hip dysplasia. Id. at 561-62. The court's award to
ALPO also included approximately $4.5 million for income lost by ALPO due to
a five-year delay in expanding the market for its puppy food to the entire nation. Id. at 562-64. This delay resulted from the competition created by Ralston
Purina's false advertising campaign. Id. The court added the $3.5 million and
$4.5 million items, and then enhanced the total by 50% pursuant to its statutory authority. Id. at 564-66. Such an enhancement was warranted, according
to the court, because the harm done to ALPO undoubtedly exceeded the damage
that was readily quantifiable. Id. Finally, the court awarded approximately
$850,000-most of it attorneys' fees-to Ralston Purina because ALPO's advertisements had contained false statements regarding veterinarians' supposed
preferences for the formula used in ALPO's puppy food. Id. at 561, 566-67.
The ALPO saga, however, lives on. The D.C. Circuit recently ordered the
district court to reconsider ALPO's responsive advertising award. ALPO
Petfoods, Inc., 997 F.2d 949, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Specifically, the district court
must determine exactly what percentage of ALPO's advertising did in fact respond to the misleading advertisements, and then reduce the award accordingly. Id. Moreover, with respect to ALPO's lost earnings, the D.C. Circuit
ordered the district court to "reduce the award for deferral of ALPO's future
income stream." Id. at 954. Lastly, because of these adjustments, the court
instructed the district court to recalculate the enhancement percentage and adjust the overall award for inflation. Id. at 955.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Logically, some statements would be covered by this language (uses of a "word, term, [or] name"), as would some acts
(uses of a "symbol" or a "device"). The tests set forth in subsections (1) and (2) of
the statute will be discussed at infra text accompanying notes 59-80.
55. Id. In order to come within the statute, the designations, descriptions,
or representations must have occurred in connection with goods or services, or
containers for goods. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying note 23 (providing former language of
§ 43(a)).
57. E.g., Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272,277 (2d Cir.
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statements were not actionable unless they were "of fact."5 8
Under subsection (1) of the new section 43(a), an act or
statement of a type specified in the introductory language violates the statute if it is "likely to cause confusion" regarding the
"origin, sponsorship, or approval" of the defendant's "goods,
services, or commercial activities," or regarding an "affiliation,
connection, or association" between the defendant and "another
person."5 9 This test, when coupled with the statute's introductory language, logically sweeps in the trademark infringement,
passing off and other unfair competition claims held actionable
under the prior version. 60 Subsection (1)'s requirements 6 1 effectively restate the "likelihood of confusion" element required in
actions for infringement of registered marks or marks protected
by the common law. 62 Although the old section 43(a) did not
1981); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165
(2d Cir. 1978).
58. See, e.g., Vidal Sassoon, 661 F.2d at 277; American Home Prods., 577
F.2d at 165. The "of fact" requirement reinforces the notion that an allegedly
false or misleading statement is actionable only if it is demonstrably false despite reasonably appearing to be an accurate statement of fact. Cf. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (applying concept of demonstrable falsity to case involving attempt to impose liability on defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims). Logically, the "of fact" requirement would seem to track defamation law's requirement that an actionable statement be demonstrably false (or, under § 43(a), misleading) rather than
solely a statement of view or preference. For discussion of such issues in defamation law, see infra note 104.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). In view of subsection (1)'s "likelihood of
confusion" requirement, the sorts of false descriptions or representations allegedly constituting false advertising under the former version of § 43(a) are probably restricted to actionability under the new version's subsection (2). The
latter subsection contains specific language referring to falsities having to do
with the "nature, characteristics, [or] qualities" of "goods, services, or commercial activities." Id. For additional discussion of claims under new subsection
(2), see infra text accompanying notes 65-100.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. For discussion of other sorts
of claims actionable under the statute, see supra note 36.
61. Somewhat curiously, however, Congress placed the statute's reference
to false or misleading statements of "geographic origin" of goods or services in
subsection (2), which does not contain a likelihood of confusion requirement. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The "geographic origin" reference fits more gracefully
in subsection (1). See id.
62. See id; see also id. § 1114(1) (setting forth standard for infringement of
registered marks); 1 J. THoMAs MCCARTH, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPnTITioN § 24:3(B)-(C) (2d ed. 1984) (discussing likelihood of confusion as to source,
origin, affiliation, and the like). For additional discussion of the likelihood of
confusion element in trademark infringement cases, see Langvardt, supra note
21, at 7-29.

1993]

COMMERCIAL FALSEHOOD

325

contain such language, 6 3 courts consistently required a likelihood of confusion element when the plaintiff brought a section
43(a) action for trademark infringement or a similar claim.6 4
2.

Subsection (2): Substantial Broadening of Allowable False
Advertising Claims

The current subsection (2), while preserving the types of
false advertising claims actionable under the superseded version, does not stop there. The substantially broadened range of
actionable false advertising claims contemplated by subsection
(2) constitutes the major difference between the two versions.
Under subsection (2), a defendant's statement, when of a type
specified by section 43(a)'s introductory language, 65 creates a
statutory cause of action if it occurs "in commercial advertising
or promotion" and "misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities."6 6
Insofar as it proscribes advertising-related6 7 statements
that misstate "the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities... of his
or her ... goods [or] services," subsection (2) does not significantly depart from prior law.68 As previously noted, courts consistently construed old section 43(a) as reaching false
advertising cases involving the defendant's false statements
63. See supra text accompanying note 23 (providing former language of
§ 43(a)).
64. See Langvardt, supra note 21, at 26-27. The text's reference to claims
similar to trademark infringement would include trade dress cases, see Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (applying former
§ 43(a)), and right of publicity-oriented claims; see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 1000-02 (2d Cir. 1989); Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360,
368 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
65. See supra text accompanying note 46 (setting forth current language of
§ 43(a)).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
67. Even though the old § 43(a) did not contain the "commercial advertising or promotion" language of the current version, id., the former version's references to "goods or services," "containers," and use in "commerce," see supra
text accompanying note 23, effectively created a promotional setting limitation
for false advertising cases; see, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d
312 (2d Cir. 1982); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272 (2d.
Cir. 1981); U-Haul Intl, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The statute's present version also covers allegedly false or misleading representations about "commercial activities."
Id. The major significance of this language is that it may sweep in certain defamation-like claims where the defendant's statement relate to the plaintiffs
commercial activities. See infra text accompanying notes 71-80.
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about its own products or services. 69 Moreover, even though the
superseded version did not contain the present references to "nature, characteristics, [or] qualities" of goods or services, the false
under the former version routinely inadvertising cases brought
70
volved such matters.
Subsection (2) departs dramatically from prior law, however, by authorizing a section 43(a) claim when the defendant
falsely or misleadingly represented the plaintiffs goods, services, or business activities. The plaintiff obviously would be "another person" within subsection (2), which encompasses
statements about "another person's goods, services, or commercial activities."7 1 The TLRA's legislative history reveals that a
major purpose underlying the amended version of section 43(a)
was legislatively to overrule cases holding that section 43(a) applied to false advertising claims only when the defendant's false72
hoods pertained to the defendant's products or services.
Envisioning the new section 43(a) as recognizing a cause of action for "commercial defamation," 73 Congress plainly set out to
69. See supra text accompanying note 42.
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
Many cases under old § 43(a) dealt with false representation about the nature,
quality, or characteristics of a product or services. See, e.g., Coca-Cola, 690
F.2d 312; Vidal Sassoon, 661 F.2d 272; U-Haul Int'l, 793 F.2d 1034.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). For purposes of the statute's reference to
"another person's goods, services, or commercial activities," one would expect
that normally the plaintiff and "another person" would be one and the same.
That has been the experience so far in cases brought under the new § 43(a).
See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir.
1991) (plaintiff was party whose goods, services, or commercial activities were
subject of defendant's statements); Nat'l Artists Management Co. v. Weaving,
769 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med.
Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (same); Janda v. Riley-Meggs Indus., 764
F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (same); Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer
Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same). One may envision the bringing of a § 43(a) claim in which A (a competitor of B and C in the sale of a given
product) sues B over B's allegedly false or misleading statements about C's
product. It should be noted, however, that in such a case, A could have considerable difficulty meeting the "is or is likely to be damaged" test for whether
standing to sue exists. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); supra note 52. An actual
case consistent with this hypothetical has not been reported.
72. S. Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A-N. 5577, 5603.
73. See 134 CONG. Ruc. H10430 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier). Even though the "commercial defamation" term used by Rep.
Kastemneier seems simple enough at first glance, it is not entirely clear
whether it truly contemplates defamation claims, or only injurious falsehood
(sometimes referred to as "trade libel") claims. Moreover, even if Congress contemplated only injurious falsehood claims arising from a commercial setting,
§ 43(a)'s new language is virtually certain to precipitate the filing of defamation

1993]

COMMERCIAL FALSEHOOD

327

make the defendant's advertising-related falsehoods actionable
regardless of whether they related to the defendant's goods,
services, or business, or to the plaintiffs. 74
The major new effect of subsection (2) is to make section
43(a) an alternative basis for certain claims that plaintiffs could
formerly only bring on defamation or injurious falsehood
grounds. As will be seen, the defendant's false statement about
the plaintiffs "goods" or "services'-now covered by section
43(a) in some instances-previously were actionable, if at all,
only on injurious falsehood grounds. 7 5 False statements about
the plaintiffs "commercial activities" formerly would have given
the plaintiff some freedom to choose between defamation and injurious falsehood, 76 but usually only those two claims. 77 Now,
however, such a statement may fall under section 43(a) as well,
providing the plaintiff with a third option in appropriate
circumstances.
It is important to note that the new section 43(a) does not
reach all cases of defamation or injurious falsehood. Subsection
(2) specifies that the statute applies to statements made in "commercial advertising or promotion." 78 Not every defamation or
claims under § 43(a) as well. For additional discussion of the effect of the new
statutory language, see infra text accompanying notes 75-100. Background discussion of the elements of defamation and injurious falsehood claims appears
infra text accompanying notes 101-145.
74. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S..C.K-N. 5577, 5603.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 116-124, 134-140. A defamation
claim would not normally arise in such circumstances. A defamation claim
would be appropriate only if the defendant's statement tended to harm the
plaintiffs overall reputation, as opposed merely to the plaintiffs economic interests. See infra text accompanying notes 125-144.
76. The plaintiffs freedom to choose between the two claims would depend
on how close to the line the reputation versus economic interests question
would be in the case at issue. See infra text accompanying notes 125-144.
77. In appropriate instances, a claim such as interference with contractual
relations or prospective advantage could also apply. See, e.g., Blatty v. New
York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1178 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934
(1988). Where the defendant's allegedly improper interference consisted of
false representations, however, the court will effectively treat the interference
claim as an injurious falsehood claim. See id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). The meaning of "commercial advertising" is
relatively clear. The term logically covers the standard fare of printed fliers,
newspaper ads, television or radio commercials, and other uses of written or
verbal statements (including visual representations) whose underlying objective is the sale of the advertiser's goods or services or the advancement of the
advertiser's business interests. See 134 CoNG. REc. H10420-21 (daily ed. Oct.
19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Paul A. Batista, Lanham Act
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Revision May Spur CommercialDefamation Claims, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991,
at 42, 43-44; James B. Kobak Jr. & Mary K. Fleck, Commercial Defamation
ClaimAdded to Revised LanhamAct, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 33. For purposes of First Amendment analysis in the direct government regulation context,
the Supreme Court has defined "commercial speech" as speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (citations omitted). Discussion of the "direct government regulation" setting appears infra at text accompanying notes 408-420.
The Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions have consistently involved
commercial advertising;, the same sort of standard fare referred to above. See
infra text accompanying notes 303-316. The legislative history of the new
§ 43(a) indicates that Congress designed the statute to apply to commercial expression of the kind addressed in the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions but not to political expression or its noncommercial equivalents. See 134
CONG. REC. H10420-21 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier);
134 CONG. Rc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
The "commercial advertising" limitation of § 43(a) may sometimes generate
close questions. For example, when the defendant's statements seem partly
commercially motivated and partly noncommercial in nature, application of the
"commercial advertising" limitation may be unclear. See Batista, supra, at 4445. Cf. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (determining that even though advertising fliers
for contraceptives sold by advertiser contained some noncommercial expression
on social issues, advertisements were predominantly motivated by commercial
concerns and were therefore classifiable as commercial speech for purposes of
First Amendment analysis).
The meaning of "promotion," as used in the new § 43(a), is somewhat less
clear. It must be applied in light of the commercial thrust of the statute. Given
the congressional concern about restricting the statute to instances of commercially motivated falsehoods, see 134 CONG. EC. H10420-21 (daily ed. Oct. 19,
1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier), and the congressional desire to create a
cause of action for "commercial defamation," id. at 10430, it seems reasonable to
conclude that "promotion" contemplates commercially motivated statements
made outside the context of conventional commercial advertising. For instance,
if a commercial party, while making in-person or telephoned sales calls on customers, makes false statements about a competitor's products, services, or commercial activities, the statements should be seen as statements of "promotion."
In such a setting, the statements are commercially motivated, just as conventional advertisements would be, even though the statements were not printed
in a flier or newspaper ad and were not aired in a television or radio commercial. See National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224,
1232-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that alleged statements by defendants about
plaintiff booking agency with which they were affiliated were sufficiently commercial or promotional for purposes of § 43(a) when made in context of calls to
solicit customers for new booking agency they intended to open, even though
calls were also partly informational or social in nature). The "promotion" classification could also be broad enough to sweep in other settings, such as press
conferences or television interviews in which a commercial party states falsehoods about a competitor's business. The key seems to be whether the statements may credibly be regarded as primarily prompted by commercial
concerns, or whether there are sufficient noncommercial motivations (such as
informing the public of a safety problem) present to make § 43(a) inapplicable.
See id. at 1232-36. See also Batista, supra, at 44 (asserting that presence of
meaningful noncommercial motivations may remove statements from scope of
§ 43(a), notwithstanding simultaneous presence of arguable commercial moti-

19931

COMMERCIAL FALSEHOOD

329

injurious falsehood case-not even every such case involving
statements about the plaintiffs "goods, services, or commercial
activities"-arises from "commercial advertising or promotion."7 9 Defamation and injurious falsehood cases not arising in
this setting continue to be actionable only under the common
80
law, and not under section 43(a).
When the section 43(a) route is available, however, the commercial plaintiff will likely find it more attractive than the defamation or injurious falsehood avenues. The main reason for
section 43(a)'s greater attractiveness to plaintiffs is that defamation and injurious falsehood contain strict elements, proof requirements and limitations that section 43(a) does not impose. 8 1
vations). Cf. infra note 79 (noting Sen. DeConcini's statements that purport to
ascribe a broader scope to § 43(a) than the statutory language and constitutional considerations would credibly seem to allow).
79. For example, if Consumer Reports magazine printed an article that
critically evaluated the plaintiffs product but allegedly made false statements
about the product, the plaintiff would not have a § 43(a) claim against the magazine or the reporter because neither could be credibly regarded as having engaged in commercial advertising or promotion. See 134 CONG. REc. H10420-21
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (specifically noting example set forth above); NationalArtists Management, 769 F. Supp. at 1232; see

also Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (noting that § 43(a) was neither meant to be used as a means of stifling
criticism, nor appropriate for use against distributor of noncommercial pamphlet that criticized government funding of arts projects and allegedly made
false representations about plaintiffs works of art).
Taking a broader view of § 43(a)'s scope, Sen. DeConcini asserted during
the Senate's deliberations that even though the statute could not reach political
speech, it would apply "any time there is a misrepresentation relating to goods
or services." 134 CONG. REc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988). He also asserted
that even nonprofit organizations' representations relating to goods or services
would be actionable under § 43(a). Id. The senator's view, if taken literally,
would allow a § 43(a) claim against Consumer Reports in the above example.
Such a view is unsound for two primary reasons. First, it is textually insupportable, given the statute's "commercial advertising and promotion" limitation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Second, magazines and similar periodicals are
customarily classified as primarily noncommercial and therefore entitled to full
First Amendment protection. See Langvardt, supra note 21, at 49-50, 53-54 &
nn.257-60. For additional discussion of full First Amendment protection for
noncommercial expression, see infra text accompanying notes 293-300. See also
National Artists Management, 769 F. Supp. at 1232-33 (rejecting Sen. DeConcini's apparent view of statute's scope as overly broad).
80. Notwithstanding expressions of apparent sentiments in favor of a
broader scope for § 43(a), the statutory language and constitutional considerations foreclose any other conclusion. See supra note 79; see also Janda v. RileyMeggs Indus., 764 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (erroneously asserting
that § 43(a) "creates a cause of action for any false description or representation
of a product").
81. The proof of fault requirement is the most notable of the stern defamation and injurious falsehood elements. For discussion of the common law and
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By restyling a suitable "defamation" or "injurious falsehood"
claim as a section 43(a) claim, the plaintiff might evade the
"troublesome," recovery-impeding aspects of defamation and injurious falsehood. To the extent that this evasion enjoys Congressional blessing, 2 it would seem, at first glance, to merit
little concern. Congress, after all, sought to authorize a "com83
mercial defamation" claim when it revamped section 43(a). If
Congress chose to give commercial plaintiffs a basis for claiming
federal question jurisdiction in such cases,8 4 it merely acted on a
matter committed to its sound discretion-or so the argument
goes.
C.

SECTION 43(a)'s "COMMERCIAL DEFAMATION" CLAIM:
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

More careful attention to the interests at stake, however,
reveals the fallacy of the argument set forth in the preceding
paragraph. Most of the elements, requirements, and limitations
that plaintiffs find troublesome in defamation law owe their
existence to the Constitution. The Supreme Court has engrafted
constitutional components of the two torts, see infra text accompanying notes
102-124, 154-287.
82. The enactment of § 43(a) without the inclusion of a fault requirement
similar to that found in defamation and injurious falsehood supplies this "Congressional blessing." See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); infra text accompanying
notes 85-100. A narrow provision in the TLRA applies to media defendants,
such as newspapers and magazines, whose sole involvement with false or misleading advertising is the publication of such an advertisement for another
party. In such a case, the statute only subjects an "innocent" media defendant
(presumably one lacking knowledge of the false or misleading content of the
advertisement) to an injunction; damages are allowed only if the media defendant knew of the falsity. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1988). Because the usual
§ 43(a) defendant would be the advertiser, not the media defendant in whose
publication the advertisement appeared, the provision is of limited applicability. This "innocent violation" defense is thus a far cry from the fault requirements that have sweeping applicability in defamation and injurious falsehood
cases. See infra text accompanying notes 154-207.
83. See 134 CONG. REc. H10430 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
84. Federal question jurisdiction applies when the plaintiffs claim arises
under the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute or treaty and allows a plaintiff
to properly bring suit in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). A specific jurisdictional statute gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits arising under
the federal patent, copyright, and trademark statutes and over claims of unfair
competiton when joined with claims for violations of the patent, copyright, or
trademark statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Absent the federal question jurisdiction
contemplated by these statutes and § 43(a), a plaintiff would have to raise its
"defamation" and "injurious falsehood" claims in state court unless the plaintiff
met the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. See id. § 1332.
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First Amendment-based rules upon the common law of defamation in order to protect defendants' interests in freedom of expression. Moreover, in the injurious falsehood context,
defendants' First Amendment rights have provided justification
for certain legal features that make such cases difficult for plaintiffs to win. 85
The new section 43(a) does not by its terms impose defamation law's most notable constitutional feature: the requirement
that the plaintiff prove fault on the defendant's part.8 6 In
amending the statute to provide the desired "commercial defamation" claim,8 7 Congress preserved the strict liability approach
of the old section 43(a). 88 In other words, section 43(a)'s new
language would allow the plaintiff to establish liability without
proving that the defendant knew of the contested statement's
falsity, displayed reckless disregard for the truth, or failed to
use reasonable care to ascertain the truth.8 9 As later discussion
will reveal, at least one such fault element almost certainly
would be required in a defamation action, and probably would be
necessary in an injurious falsehood case. 90
A fundamental issue thus arises: whether plaintiffs who
would be subject to First Amendment-mandated proof requirements in a suit brought on defamation or injurious falsehood
grounds, may evade those same strictures by bringing the same
claim under section 43(a). When viewed in this manner, the issue must be answered in the negative 91 even when the at85. For a detailed discussion of the First Amendment aspects of defamation and injurious falsehood, see infra text accompanying notes 154-207.
86. The defamation fault requirement varies in intensity depending upon
the plaintiffs status. The requirement focuses on what the defendant knew or
should have known about the falsity of the statement giving rise to the suit, as
well as on the defendant's efforts to determine the statement's truth or falsity.
See infra text accompanying notes 154-277.
87. See 134 CoNG. REc. H10430 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (absence of language requiring proof of
fault); see also BeVier, supra note 9, at 30-31 (noting strict liability approaches
of former and present versions of § 43(a)); Gunn, supra note 37, at 714, 721
(same); Singdahlsen, supra note 37, at 339, 341-42 (same).
89. No such language appears in § 43(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
This seems to mean that even a defendant with a good-faith belief in its statement's truth (based on reasonable evidence) could face liability under the statute if the plaintiff proved the statement was actually false. Whether the First
Amendment allows such a result, of course, presents another question. See infra text accompanying notes 163-167, 201-204.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 168-173, 177-178, 201-207, 282-289.
91. A negative answer does not automatically translate into a statement
that courts should impose the identical First Amendment-based requirements
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tempted evasion apparently conforms with the language
Congress used-or did not use.9 2 Federal statutes are no less
subject to the Constitution than is the common law.
To its credit, Congress did show some concern about First
Amendment values when enacting the TLRA. The legislative
history reveals that Congress deleted certain proposed provisions based at least in part on the First Amendment.9 3 In addition, the "commercial advertising or promotion" limitation in
subsection (2) resulted from a desire to safeguard First Amendment interests. One of the legislation's chief sponsors stated
that Congress designed the quoted limitation to restrict subsection (2)'s applicability to instances of false or misleading "commercial speech," as defined in Supreme Court decisions. 9 4 Those
decisions, discussed below, 9 5 indicate that although commercial
speech receives an intermediate level of First Amendment protection, misleading commercial speech merits no protection. As
will be seen, however, the Supreme Court's commercial speech
cases arose in the context of direct government restrictions on
speech, 96 rather than in the defamation-like context of suits for
damages. In the latter setting, the Court has consistently found
it necessary to insulate some false statements from liability in
order to protect "speech that matters."9 7 The importance of recognizing commercial expression as "speech that matters" comof defamation and injurious falsehood in § 43(a) cases. As phrased, the issue
speaks of "evad[ing] the First Amendment's strictures" by suing under § 43(a).
These "strictures," as applied to § 43(a) cases, may differ from those imposed in
defamation and injurious falsehood actions. One may therefore answer the
question with a "no" and still take the position, as this article does later, that
the proper First Amendment-based requirements for § 43(a) cases do not correspond exactly to those of defamation and injurious falsehood. See infra text
accompanying notes 399-407, 421-461.
92. Even though it sought to create a "commercial defamation" cause of
action, see 134 CONG. REC. H10420 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Kastenmeier), Congress did not include a fault requirement in the language of
§ 43(a), see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
93. Prior to the TLRA's passage, the drafters deleted proposals to allow
causes of action for trademark tarnishment and trademark disparagement, at
least in part due to First Amendment concerns. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C-A-N. 5579, 5604; Hearing on H.R.
4156, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Admin. of Justice, Comm. on
the Judiciary, H.R., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (Sept. 8, 1988).
94. See 134 CONG. Rlc. H10420-21 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); 134 CoNG. Ruc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (remarks of
Sen. DeConcini). But see supranotes 78-79 (discussing difficulty of determining
statute's scope, notwithstanding supposed "commercial speech" limitation).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 301-345.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 408-413.
97. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). For discussion of
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pels the conclusion that section 43(a)(2) creates significant First
Amendment problems-notwithstanding Congress's seemingly
well-intentioned attempt to head off such problems by limiting
the statute to the commercial setting.
Thus, Congress erred when it enacted the "commercial defamation" component of section 43(a), by not adequately accounting for the First Amendment interests at stake for speakers and
their audience. 98 Courts should not repeat the mistake when
they decide "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" cases
brought under section 43(a). Unfortunately, however, some
courts have made precisely this error.99 Freedom of expressionbased requirements must be read into subsection (2) to harmonize it with the First Amendment. In order to properly formulate those requirements, 10 0 it is necessary to examine
defamation and injurious falsehood law, their constitutional
components, and other relevant aspects of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
III. DEFAMATION AND INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD: THE
COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
Defamation and injurious falsehood claims serve as tort
law's traditional avenues of recovery for the consequences of another's false statements. Their common law elements and conceptual underpinnings reflect both similarities and differences.
the Supreme Court's major defamation decisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 154-276.

98. Consumers' rights to receive commercial information provide much of
the foundation for the notion that courts should grant commercial speakers
some degree of First Amendment protection. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976).
See infra text accompanying notes 308-314.
99. See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d
1544 (2d Cir. 1991); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958
(D.C. Cir. 1990); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia,
898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990); American Express
Travel Related Services Co. v. Mastercard Intl, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Nat'l Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991);
Janda v. Riley-Meggs Indus., 764 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Weight
Watchers Intl, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In
most of the cases just cited, the court avoided or ignored the First Amendment
implications of§ 43(a). In U.S. HealthcareandEnergy Four,the courts touched
upon First Amendment questions but dealt with them unsatisfactorily. For discussion of U.S. Healthcareand Energy Four,see infra text accompanying notes
350-394.

100. For the content and form of these requirements see infra text accompanying notes 421-461.
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A. THE ELEMENTs OF DEFAMATION
The common law defines defamation as the publication of a
false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff.10 1 Defamatory statements, by definition, tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation. 10 2 Defamation's focus on reputation receives greater
attention below, because it is the major concept separating defamation from injurious falsehood.' 0 3 For present purposes, it is
worth emphasizing that even though some true statements may
tend to harm reputation (and hence are defamatory), only those
statements which are both false 10 4 and defamatory give rise to a

valid defamation claim. 10 5

The publication element of defamation requires that the
false statement have been communicated to at least one person
101. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). Defamation comes in
two varieties: libel (defamation by written or printed word) and slander (defamation by oral statement). Id. § 568. Libel and slander receive essentially
identical common law treatment-except for somewhat different damages
rules-and are subject to the same First Amendment requirements. See id.
§§ 558, 568 & cmt. c, 569-70, 575. This article will generally use the broader
term "defamation."
102. Id. § 559. The RESTATEmmr labels a statement as defamatory "if it
tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."
Id.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 125-133.
104. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). In order for a statement to be actionable, it must be one of "fact." This means that the statement
must be demonstrably false despite reasonably appearing to be an accurate
statement of fact. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)
(applying concept of demonstrable falsity to case involving attempt to impose
liability on defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress grounds).
Pure opinions are not statements of "fact" because they simply express a view
or preference that does not contain demonstrably true or false components. The
lack of demonstrable falsity in pure opinions renders them generally non-actionable under defamation law. The same cannot be said, however, of statements cast in the form of opinions which contain express or implied components
that are arguably factual and therefore capable of being shown to be true or
false. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 21 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 & cmts. b, c. If a statement is not put forth as a

fact and reasonable hearers or readers would not interpret it as stating an actual fact about the plaintiff, the statement is non-actionable even though at
some level it might literally be false. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56
(allegations of certain actions not actually taken by plaintiff were non-actionable when put forth in context of what public would perceive as attempt at humor rather than attempt to state actual facts about plaintiff).
105. The requirement that a statement be both defamatory and false in order to be actionable also has First Amendment underpinnings. See, e.g., Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 279 (1964).
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other than the immediate parties. 10 6 The requirement that the
statement be about the plaintiff-the "of and concerning" requirementl 0 7 -is satisfied if the defendant's statement names,
refers to, identifies, or describes the plaintiff in such a way that
a reasonable reader or hearer would regard the statement as being about the plaintiff.'0 8
Two other common law aspects of defamation are noteworthy, not because of what they require plaintiffs to prove but, in
contrast, because of what they do not require.' 0 9 First, the common law takes a strict liability approach that does not require
the plaintiff to prove the defendant's fault.1 10 Even a defendant
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Usually, it must be the
defendant or the defendant's agent, and not the plaintiff, who has made the
communication to the third party or parties in order to satisfy the publication
element. Id. & cmts. f, k.
107. See id. § 564 & cmts. a, b, d, g.
108. Id. This means that a statement about a group (other than perhaps a
very small group) generally cannot serve as a valid basis for a defamation claim
by an individual member of the group. See id. It should also be noted that the
Supreme Court appears to have given the "ofand concerning" element constitutional status. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288-92 (1964).
109. In addition to the two aspects discussed in the text, common law defamation contained a third feature that relieved the plaintiff of proving a fundamental element of a defamation claim: it did not require the defamation
plaintiff to prove the falsity of the defendant's statement. Instead, the common
law recognized a presumption of falsity, and expected the defendant to carry
the burden of proving the statement's truth if she hoped to escape liability on
that basis. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 116, at 839. The presumption offalsity has been almost entirely, if not entirely, overridden by defamation's constitutional components. See infra notes 174, 206.
110. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 113, at 804. As used in the text, "fault"
contemplates notions such as knowledge of falsity, lack of reasonable attempts
to ascertain the truth, and the like-notions that went unaccounted for in the
common law's strict liability approach. The question of fault, however, lies at
the heart of defamation's constitutionalization. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-48 (1974) (noting the First Amendment problems created by common law's strict liability approach). For discussion of the constitutional aspects of defamation law, see infra text accompanying notes 154-207.
The common laws strict liability approach is consistent with § 43(a)'s literal
content, which does not require fault. See supra text accompanying notes 81100.
Although the common law did not require proof of fault as an element of
the plaintiffs case-in-chief, it historically recognized (and continues to recognize) the existence of absolute and conditional privilege defenses in certain settings involving the communication of false and defamatory statements. For
discussion of such privileges, the contexts in which they arise and the ability of
plaintiffs to defeat a conditional privilege defense by proving such facts as the
defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his statement, see KEETON et al., supra
note 2, § 115; Langvardt, supra note 3, at 911-13. The common law's limited
use of fault notions to defeat sometimes-applicable conditional privilege defenses meant that such notions arose only in a limited range and number of
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who possesses a well-founded belief in a statement's truth faces
liability if the statement is actually proved false.
Second, the common law does not require the plaintiff to
prove reputational injury in most defamation cases. Instead,
the common law generally allows presumed damages if the defendant's false statement appears to be the sort that tends to
Presumed damages are ostensibly compenharm reputation.'
satory in nature because they are awarded for a supposed
reputational injury. 1 12 An "oddity of tort law,"" 3 they allow
compensation for harm whose very existence and extent need
not be demonstrated. Although concerns about potentially undesirable effects of presumed damages have caused the Supreme
Court to constitutionally limit their applicability, 114 presumed
damages remain available in some instances." x5

B. THE ELEMENTS

OF INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD

Some of the common law elements of injurious falsehood resemble or mirror those of defamation. Injurious falsehood is the
publication, with fault, of a false statement about the plaintiff's
business, business practices, product, service, property, or property rights, which results in harm, measured by proven special
damages, to the plaintiffs economic interest. 1 6 The falsity and
cases. Such an approach fell far short of what the constitutional aspects of defamation law contemplate: proof of fault as an element of the plaintiffs case-inchief in nearly all cases. See infra text accompanying notes 154-276.
111. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS §§ 569, 570, 575, 622 cmt. a (1977).
The common law allowed presumed damages in all cases of libel but not in slander cases unless they involved slander per se. Id. §§ 569, 570, 575. Slander
cases not involving slander per se required proof of special damages. Id. § 575.
One of the types of statements considered slander per se was the falsehood that
would tend to harm the plaintiff in his, her, or its business, occupation, or profession. See id. §§ 570, 574. Many of the commercial falsehoods giving rise to
the types of cases dealt with in this article would therefore qualify as libel or as
slander per se. Thus, if the common law of defamation controlled, presumed
damages would be available. Of course, even when the law allows presumed
damages, the plaintiff may attempt to prove actual damages in an effort to augment recovery. See id. § 623 cmt. a.
112. See id. § 621 cmt. a.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Gertz placed
First Amendment-based limitations on the common laws allowance of presumed and punitive damages, but did not eliminate such damages. See id. at
349-50; infra text accompanying notes 201-212.
114. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
115. For discussion of the decisions in which First Amendment considerations caused the Supreme Court to limit, though not eliminate, the availability
of presumed and punitive damages, see infra text accompanying notes 159-276.
116. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 967. Courts sometimes refer to
certain variations of injurious falsehood claims as "slander of title," "product
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publication requirements comprise the 1major
elements common
17
to defamation and injurious falsehood.
Injurious falsehood's common law elements differ markedly,
however, from those of defamation in other respects. Injurious
falsehood plaintiffs must prove the defendant's fault, although
the applicable standard varies by jurisdiction.:" 8 Some states
require proof that the defendant made the statement with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth,119 others that the defendant possessed ill will or malice
toward the plaintiff.120 Still others require a showing that the
x21
defendant intended to inflict economic harm on the plaintiff'
In addition, plaintiffs in injurious falsehood cases must
prove special damages in the form of economic loss stemming
from the false statements at issue. Presumed damages are not
available. 12 2 Moreover, the special damages requirement exists
as an essential element of the plaintiffs case, rather than as a
prerequisite to recovery beyond nominal damages. If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate special damages,' 2 3 the court will grant
disparagement," or "trade libel" claims. See id. at 962-63. For additional background on injurious falsehood claims and the settings in which they may arise,
see Langvardt, supra note 3, at 913-23.
117. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 623A (1977). Injurious
falsehood's falsity element includes the "of 'fact" requirement found in defamation law, and reflects a similar approach to the treatment of statements of opinion. See id. §§ 623A cmt. e, 634 & cmt. c; supra note 104. Injurious falsehood
law tends to allow privilege defenses on grounds similar to those found in defamation law. See id. § 646A; supra note 110; Langvardt, supra note 3, at 915-16.
118. See KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 969. For additional discussion of the variations of the fault requirement in injurious falsehood cases, see
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 916-18.
119. See, e.g., Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); General Prods. Co. v. Meredith
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D. Va. 1981). The fault standard is the same as
the actual malice requirement established in the constitutional law of defamation, see infra text accompanying notes 168-173, 177-178, but it is applied here
as a common law matter. The Restatement calls for the actual malice requirement in al injurious falsehood cases, but does so on First Amendment grounds.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623A & cmt. c (1977).
120. See, e.g., Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555
F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1977). Such a fault requirement is sometimes known
as common law malice. See Rodney Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 65 n.308 (1983).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623A caveats (1), (2) (1977).
Still other states require varying combinations of the fault requirements set
forth at supra text accompanying notes 119-121, or allow choices between or
among them. See, e.g., Annbar Assocs. v. American Express Co., 565 S.W.2d
701 (Mo. App. 1978).
122. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 967, 970-71.
123. The necessary special damages consist of economic loss directly tracea-
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24
neither nominal damages nor any other relief.1

C.

THE REPUTATION-ECONOMIC INTEREST DISTINCTION

1.

Defamation's Focus on Protection of Reputation

The conceptual difference between defamation and injurious falsehood lies in the respective interest each safeguards.
Defamation law protects the plaintiffs reputational interests.
For purposes of defamation actions, an individual's reputation
of honesty, ethics, morality and profesencompasses notions
25
sional competence.'
Courts also regard corporations and similar entities as permissible defamation plaintiffs. 12 6 Their reputational interests
likewise depend upon notions of integrity and professional competence.' 27 Solvency also comprises a fundamental part of the
corporate reputational interest, due to the business-oriented
128
reputation of corporations and other profit driven entities.
Corporate and human plaintiffs do not, however, share all of the
elements of potential recovery in a defamation case. Their obvious differences require that only human plaintiffs may recover
damages for emotional distress, humiliation2 9and the like, resulting from the defendant's false statement.'
ble to the defendant's false statement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 623A, 633 (1977). Injurious falsehood's traditional approach to proving special damages required the plaintiff to identify specific lost customers and the
like. In recent years, however, courts have become increasingly flexible regarding acceptable means of proof, allowing circumstantial proof in appropriate instances. See, e.g. Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 150
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
124. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 970-71; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS §§ 623A, 633, 651 (1977). A failure to prove special damages would
mean, therefore, that the court could not issue an injunction. See id. Injurious
falsehood law thus differs from § 43(a), which courts generally construe not to
require proof of actual damages as a prerequisite to injunctive relief. See supra
note 52.
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559, 569, 571 (1977).
126. KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 111, at 779; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 561 & cmt. b (1977).
127. E.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119,
1122-25, 1137-38 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 561 cmt. b (1977).
128. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 561 cmt. b (1977).
129. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Corporations, being artificial "persons" that are incapable of experiencing feelings, logically cannot recover for humiliation and other emotional harm. Cf. id. (noting
that damages for "personalhumiliation" are recoverable) (emphasis supplied).
Courts make no distinction, however, between human and corporate plaintiffs
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Defamation provides the proper avenue if the defendant's
false statement would tend to harm the plaintiffs reputation in
a sense noted above. For example, a false statement that an individual is a perjurer' 3 0 or connected with organized crime' 31 is
actionable if all other elements of defamation are met. Actionable statements about a corporate plaintiff include, for instance,
untrue assertions that the plaintiff declared bankruptcy 3 2 or
adopted a strategy to induce minors to use a product legally re13
served for adults. 3
2. Injurious Falsehood's Focus on Harm to Economic Interest
Whereas defamation concerns safeguarding the plaintiffs
reputation, 13 4 injurious falsehood focuses on something narrower: the plaintiffs economic interest. 13 5 The element requiring the defendant's statement to have been about the plaintiffs
business, business practices, product, service, property, or property rights reveals this focus. The special damages requirement
further highlights injurious falsehood's economic interest
13 6
premise.
Plaintiffs, whether natural persons or artificial entities,
possess economic interests in their businesses, the products they
sell, the services they provide and the property they own. 13 7 Untrue allegations that adversely affect these interests may give
rise to injurious falsehood claims. For example, consider an assertion that the food item made and sold by the plaintiff has a
high fat content, when in reality the fat content is quite low. If
in terms of ability to recover presumed damages. See, e.g., Brown &Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1985). For an analysis of whether the heavily economic
nature of the corporate reputation makes the lack of such a distinction insensible, see Arlen W. Langvardt, A PrincipledApproach to Compensatory Damages
in CorporateDefamation Cases, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 491 (1990).

130. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
131. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). The
plaintiffs in Hepps lost the case, however, due to their inability to prove the
falsity of the defendants' allegation. Id. at 769-70, 776-79.
132. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 751-52.
133. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 827 F.2d at 1122-25, 1138-39.
134. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1977) This is more
clearly true of the common law than of defamations constitutional aspects,
which focus primarily on the defendant's freedom of expression interests. See
infra text accompanying notes 154-276.
135. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623A & cmt. g (1977).
136. See KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 967.
137. See id. at 965-66; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A, 626 &
cmt. a, 629 (1977).
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this false assertion-made in the climate of increased public attention to now familiar health warnings about high-fat dietsreduces the plaintiffs sales, an injurious falsehood claim may be
in order. 138 This would be true regardless of whether the plaintiffs competitor or a newspaper reporter writing on health issues made the false statement. 139 Similarly, an assertion that
the plaintiffs hotel was fully booked when it actually had a
number of vacancies would be actionable on injurious falsehood
140
grounds if the plaintiff experienced actual economic injury.
In determining whether a defamation or injurious falsehood
claim properly applies to a particular set of facts, one must recall the distinction between reputation and economic interests.
If the defendant's false statement harms the plaintiffs economic
interest without tarnishing the plaintiffs reputation, injurious
falsehood is the proper claim.' 4 ' If, however, the false statement possesses the requisite tendency to harm the plaintiffs
reputation, defamation is the appropriate claim-even though
the statement may have also harmed the plaintiffs economic interests. 142 Plaintiffs typically prefer defamation to injurious
falsehood if the facts plausibly support an allegation of probable
reputational harm. This preference stems from the difficulty of
satisfying injurious falsehood's special damages requirement,
143
coupled with defamation's potential for presumed damages.
138. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 623A, 626 & cmt. a, 629
(1977). These cases are sometimes referred to as product disparagement cases.
See supra note 116.
139. See id. The plaintiff could probably bring the injurious falsehood claim
against the competitor under § 43(a). See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text. The claim against the newspaper reporter, however, almost certainly
would not be actionable under § 43(a). Id.
140. See Annbar Assocs. v. American Express Co., 565 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. App.
1978). The economic injury would be the loss of patrons who would have stayed
at the hotel if not for the false representation. See id.
141. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1977). Certain
falsehoods that harm the plaintiff's economic interest need not be seen as also
harming the plaintiffs reputation. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 921 &
n.120.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. g (1977); Langvardt,
supra note 3, at 920-21. When a case arises in a business setting and the plaintiff is a corporation or partnership, the plaintiffs reputation will logically have
significant economic overtones. See Langvardt, supra note 129, at 518-19.
143. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119
(7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). In Brown & Williamson, the
corporate plaintiff could not demonstrate an economic loss resulting from the
defendants' false statement about an advertising strategy the plaintiff allegedly
adopted. Id. at 1139. Therefore, had the plaintiff been able to sue only on injurious falsehood grounds, it would have lost the suit. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124. Because the defendants' statement was actionable on
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One often encounters difficulty in drawing the reputation-economic interest distinction. 144 The mechanics of drawing that
line in particular cases need not be further explored here, however, given the breadth of section 43(a)'s new language. 14 5
3.

Section 43(a)'s Application to Reputational Injury and
Economic Harm

Section 43(a) now sweeps in claims from a broad range of
commercial falsehoods about commercial plaintiffs. The statute
covers certain reputational and economic interest-based claims,
effectively lumping together what the common law historically
kept separate. Section 43(a) does so by authorizing claims based
on false or misleading statements about the "nature, characteristics, [or] qualities" of the plaintiff's "goods, services, or commercial activities," if the statements were made in "commercial
advertising or promotion." 14 6 Undoubtedly the statute's "goods,
services, or commercial activities" language, which corresponds
closely to the subject matter contemplated by the common law
elements of injurious falsehood, 14 7 would cover many injurious
falsehood cases arising in a commercial context.
The statute's "goods [or] services" language may encompass
some defamation claims. They will more likely be swept in, however, by the "or commercial activities" language. 148 Defamation
actions based on statements about such activities have not been
uncommon in our courts.' 49 Moreover, the "likely to be damdefamation grounds and the plaintiff proved all necessary common law and constitutional elements, the plaintiff received a substantial award of presumed
damages. Brown & Williamson, 827 F.2d at 1122-25, 1138-40, 1142.
144. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof DefamationLaw: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. Rav. 691, 699 (1986); Langvardt,
supra note 3, at 920-22.
145. For discussion of the need to maintain the reputation-economic interests line despite the difficulties sometimes associated with drawing it, see
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 904-06, 920-23.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
147. See id; see also supra text accompanying note 116 (discussing the sort
of statement necessary to give rise to an injurious falsehood claim). When it
enacted the present version of § 43(a), Congress at the very least meant to
sweep in injurious falsehood claims arising in the "commercial advertising or
promotion" setting. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75, 78-80; supra
note 73. For discussion of the probable meaning and scope of the "commercial
advertising or promotion" language in § 43(a), see supra notes 78-79.
148. See 134 CONG. REc. H10430 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (Rep. Kastenmeier's observation that the amended § 43(a) was intended to create a cause
of action for "commercial defamation).
149. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985) (allegation that corporate plaintiff filed for bankruptcy); Brown &
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aged" language' 50 does not limit standing to those plaintiffs who
have suffered demonstrable injurious falsehood-like harm to
economic interests. Commercial plaintiffs claiming defamationlike reputational injury, actual or probable, would seem to fit
within this language. Thus, section 43(a) apparently allows a
commercial plaintiffs claim, 15 1 whether for reputational injury
or economic harm falling short thereof, if the claim is based on
statements made in the requisite setting of "commercial adver152
tising or promotion."
The recent extension of section 43(a) to cover many commercial "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" claims would be
much less troublesome if it only affected the common law elements and underlying premises of defamation and injurious
falsehood. 15 3 Increasingly, however, courts have subjected those
areas of law to constitutional limitations in the form of First
Amendment-based rules engrafted on their common law
elements.
IV. DEFAMATION AND INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD: A
CONSTITUTIONAL GLOSS
If a single year may be identified as defamation law's proverbial "turning point," whether for good or for ill,' T5 it would be

1964. Prior to that year, the Supreme Court had consistently
Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 993 (1988) (allegation that tobacco company adopted advertising strategy designed to induce minors to begin smoking); Turner v. Welliver, 411
N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 1987) (allegation that plaintiff engaged in unethical insurance practices); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220 (N.J.
1986) (allegation that plaintiff sold impure bottled water).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
151. For discussion of the prevailing judicial approaches to the awarding of
injunctive relief and damages under § 43(a), see supra notes 51-53.
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); supra text accompanying notes 65-80;
supra notes 78-79.
153. In that event, the only real objection would be that "federalizing" such
claims does not make good public policy. See Hearing on H.R. 4156, Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, & Administration of Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R., 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 100, 104-05 (Sept. 8, 1988) (statement of Professor Ralph Brown questioning the wisdom of federalizing much of injurious
falsehood law).
154. Compare Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. Rav. 191, 194 (calling
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), "the best and most important [decision] ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech") with Richard
- Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 782
(1986) (asserting that the long-term effects of New York Times on defamation
law are more negative than positive).

1993]

COMMERCIAL FALSEHOOD

343

held that the First Amendment left defamation law unconstrained, save for the longstanding rule against injunctions as
impermissible prior restraints.' 55 In the 1964 case of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,' 5 6 however, the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment's freedom of speech and press clauses indeed play a substantial role in defamation law.' 5 7 New York
Times launched a series of decisions in which the Court has
sketched-sometimes clearly, sometimes not' 5 8-defamation's
constitutional contours. As will be seen, this line of decisions
reflects an ongoing struggle over how defamation law should
strike the balance between the plaintiffs reputational interest
and the defendant's competing interest in free expression.
A. PUBLIC OFFiciAL PLAmNTIFFs

IN DEFAMATION CASES

In New York Times, the plaintiff, an Alabama police commissioner, claimed that certain factual errors in a paid Times
advertisement defamed him.' 59 The Supreme Court concluded
that the item was not a commercial advertisement even though
the sponsoring group paid for the newspaper space in which it
appeared.' 60 Instead, the Court found the advertisement to be
155. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931). Rather than being able to

stifle speech by obtaining an injunction against further speech, plaintiffs in defamation cases must seek damages after-the-fact. Id. Defamation law maintains this approach today. Injurious falsehood law, however, takes a different
approach, under which injunctive relief may be available. KEETON et al., supra
note 2, § 128, at 928, 971. See Lisa M. Arent, Note, A Matter of 'Governing'
Importance7: ProvidingBusiness Defamation and ProductDisparagementDefendants full FirstAmendment Protection, 67 IND. L.J. 441, 449-50 (1992). Injunctions are also allowed in § 43(a) cases. See supra note 52.
156. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. See id. at 256, 264 (expressly referring to freedom of speech clause as
well as to freedom of press clause).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 163-276.
159. 376 U.S. at 256-59.
160. Id. at 265-66. This conclusion was significant because at that time,
courts regarded commercial speech as falling outside the First Amendment's
protective scope. Not until roughly a decade later did the Supreme Court deem
commercial speech to be entitled to First Amendment protection. See infra text

accompanying notes 308-310. In holding that the expression at issue in New
York Times merited substantial protection even though the sponsoring group
paid for the newspaper space, the Times received that payment, and the sponsoring group sought monetary contributions for its cause, the Court drew an
analogy to books and other forms of expression in which economic motives may
play a role. See 376 U.S. at 256, 266. The Court also emphasized the importance of not "shackl[ing] the First Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.'" Id. at 266 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945)).
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political speech, because of its commentary on the civil rights
struggle, "one of the major public issues of our time."16 1 As
viewed by the Alabama courts, however, the factual errors justinewspaper and cerfied a $500,000 damage award against16the
2
group.
sponsoring
the
of
tain members
The Supreme Court's primary inquiry focused on the potential constitutional deficiency of defamation's then-prevailing
strict liability standard, which the Court thought likely to chill
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 16 3 The Court rea164
soned that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,"
and that a strict liability regime, coupled with the threat of huge
damage awards, might deter speakers from contributing true
statements to the marketplace of ideas contemplated by the
First Amendment's guarantees. They would refrain for fear of
the resulting consequences-potentially devastating liability-if
the statements they reasonably believed true turned out to be
false. 165 The Court therefore found it essential to devise a rule
that would protect makers of some false statements from liability in order to provide the "breathing space" necessary for free
In addition to the notion that expression in the form of a paid advertisement is not necessarily commercial speech, see id., New York Times may fairly
be read as standing for two other propositions regarding classification of expression. The first is that speech having underlying economic motives may
nonetheless deal with matters of public concern. See id. at 271; infra text accompanying note 161. The second is that in order to classify expression properly, it is necessary to look at the substance of what was said, not merely the
form in which it appeared. See 376 U.S. at 265-66, 271. These propositions
help influence the determination of the proper role of the First Amendment in
§ 43(a) cases. See infra text accompanying notes 400-407.
161. 376 U.S. at 271. Rather than being a commercial advertisement for the
sale of a product, the advertisement largely stated the sponsoring group's views
on the ongoing civil rights struggle. Id. at 256-59, 265-66. It also protested the
manner in which law enforcement officials treated student demonstrators and
Dr. Martin Luther King. In the course of doing so, the item made erroneous
statements. Id. at 257-59.
162. Id. at 256. The state court reached this result even though the defendants' statements did not expressly refer to the plaintiff and despite the questionable "stretch" involved in concluding that the statements even impliedly
referred to him. See id. at 288-89; see also id. at 288-92 (Court's apparent extension of constitutional status to defamation law's "of and concerning" requirement). The $500,000 damage award represented the full amount requested,
even though the plaintiff made no attempt to prove actual reputational harm.
Id. at 256, 260.
163. Id. at 264, 267-68. The state court's enforcement of Alabama defamation law provided the state action necessary to implicate the First Amendment.
Id. at 265.
164. Id. at 271.
165. See id. at 267-68, 271-72, 278-79.
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expression to flourish. 166 In other words, the Court concluded
that allowing some falsehoods to be uttered without defamation
liability was constitutionally superior to chilling speakers' First
Amendment rights to contribute true statements of value to
16 7
society.
1.

Enunciation of Fault Requirement

In the Court's view, a First Amendment-based fault requirement would provide the necessary "breathing space." 1 68 It
therefore enunciated what has come to be known as the New
York Times rule: in addition to defamation's customary elements, plaintiffs who are public officials must prove "actual malice" on the defendant's part in order to prevail. 169 According to
the Court, "actual malice" means making a statement with
either knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth. 70
Although the New York Times Court failed to clearly define
"reckless disregard for the truth," it made plain that mere negligence in failing to ascertain truth or falsity does not rise to that
level. 17 ' Later, the Court clarified the reckless disregard standard, stating that it contemplates a defendant who "in fact entertained serious doubts" about the truth of the statement before

making it.172 In sum, the actual malice requirement simultane-

ously increases substantially the public official plaintiffs' 1 73 burden of proof, and insulates, from defamation liability, makers of
falsehoods uttered with neither knowledge of falsity nor serious
doubts about truth.
166. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
167. See id. at 278-79. This conclusion was consistent with "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at 270.
168. See id. at 272, 279-80.
169. Id. at 279-80. The Court appeared to conclude that if the plaintiff
demonstrated actual malice, the plaintiff could then constitutionally recover
presumed and punitive damages. See id. at 283-84 & n.24.
170. Id. at 279-80.
171. Id. at 288. The Court stressed that "the evidence against the Times
supports at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice." Id.
172. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
173. The effects are the same in cases brought by public figure plaintiffs.
See infra text accompanying notes 178-186.
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2. Heightened Standard of Proof as to Fault Requirement
Besides enunciating the actual malice rule, 174 the Court, in
New York Times, raised the standard of proof for actual malice
as an additional safeguard to the First Amendment interests at
stake. It held that plaintiffs must prove actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence, not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1 75 The Court concluded that even under a preponderance standard, let alone the requisite clear and convincing standard, the evidence produced at trial fell far short of establishing
76
actual malice by the Times or the individual defendants.'

B. PUBLIC FIGuRE

PLAINTIFFS IN DEFAMATION CASES

1. Extending New York Times
The Court did not confine defamation's constitutionalization
to the public official setting for long; three years after New York
Times, the Court decided the companion cases of CurtisPublishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.'7 7 Chief Justice
Warren's concurrence provided the holding and controlling rarequirement to
tionale, as the Court extended its actual 7malice
8
suits brought by public figure plaintiffs.'
In support of this extension, Chief Justice Warren reasoned
that public figures resemble public officials as objects of intense
public interest and potentially influential participants in public
debate.' 7 9 Moreover, he noted, public figures usually enjoy
174. Although it did not squarely hold that the public official plaintiff must
prove the statement's falsity, the Court expressed reservations about a rule requiring a defamation defendant to prove its truth. Thus, New York Times may
have implicitly imposed a proof-of-falsity requirement on public plaintiffs. See
376 U.S. at 271, 279. Indeed, the Court so interpreted New York Times in later
decisions. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775
(1986); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1979).
175. 376 U.S. at 285-86. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974). Although the clear and convincing standard is somewhat imprecisely
defined, it apparently falls somewhere between the preponderance standard
normally employed in civil cases and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
required in criminal cases. See BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
176. See 376 U.S. at 286-88.
177. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
178. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). In doing so, the Court also implicitly extended, to the public figure plaintiff setting, New York Times's clear
and convincing proof standard (for the actual malice requirement), proof of falsity requirement, and approach to damages. See id. at 164-65, 170. For discussion of those aspects of New York Times, see supra text accompanying notes
174-175 and notes 169, 174.
179. 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). In one companion case, a
Saturday Evening Post article alleged that the plaintiff, Butts, a famous ex-
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ready access to the mass media and may thereby shape public
policy and counter criticism of themselves.' 8 0 In the view of the
Chief Justice and the Justices who joined him to form a majority
on the actual malice holding, no sound reason emerged to treat
public figure plaintiffs any differently from public official
plaintiffs.' 8 1
Although periodically targeted for criticism, 8 2 the actual
malice rule for public officials and public figures has weathered
a number of applications by the Supreme Court, and the Court
does not seem likely to abandon it any time soon.' 8 3 Accordingly, a public plaintiff is destined to lose a defamation suit despite the falsity of the statement allegedly giving rise to
reputational injury, unless the plaintiff proves clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew of the statement's falsity or
entertained serious doubts as to its truth. This combination of
the actual malice requirement and the enhanced standard of
proof becomes a tall order-so tall that public plaintiffs have
considerable difficulty winning defamation suits.'8 4 Because a
finding that the plaintiff is a public figure is often outcome-defootball coach, attempted to fix a college football game. Id. at 135-37 (opinion of
Harlan, J.). In the other case, an Associated Press dispatch alleged that plaintiff Walker (a retired general) led a violent mob against federal marshals who
had been sent to enforce a desegregation order at the University of Mississippi.
Id. at 140-41.
180. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). In a later decision involving a
private figure plaintiff, the Court pointed to the public's lack of intense interest
in such plaintiffs and to these plaintiffs' relative inability to influence public
debate, as justification for requiring such plaintiffs to satisfy elements less
stringent than those required in public plaintiff cases. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). For additional discussion of Gertz, see
infra text accompanying notes 187-212, 229-235.
181. 388 U.S. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See id. at 170 (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by White, J.)
182. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 155, at 783-85; Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting & Cable, Inc., 476 U.S. 1187, 1188 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting
from denial of cert.); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 767-74 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
183. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); HarteHanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
184. For examples of cases in which a public official or public figure plaintiff
did not prevail due to inability to satisfy the actual malice requirement, see
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265
(1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); cf.Hustler
Magazine, 485 U.S. 46 (public figure plaintiff who cannot demonstrate false
statement of supposed fact and actual malice must lose speech-based intentional infliction of emotional distress case). But see Harte-Hanks Communica-
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terminative, 8 5 plaintiffs seek to avoid that classification whenever they may plausibly do so.186
Making the Public Figure Determination

2.

The making of public figure determinations is guided by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,187 a case also notable for its "constitutionalization" of private figure plaintiff cases, a feature which
will be discussed later.' 8 8 In the course of determining that the
plaintiff, an attorney, was not a public figure, 18 9 the Court recognized two types of public figures. One type, the general purpose public figure, acquires "such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts." The other type, the limited purpose public figure, "voluntarily injects himself... into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." 90
Both must prove actual malice as an element of a defamation

claim.191
tions, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (public figure plaintiff proved
actual malice); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (same).
185. This frequent effect stems from the extreme difficulty of proving actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence. See supra note 184 (citing cases). Private figure plaintiffs encounter no such difficulty when attempting to establish
a defendant's liability for defamation. See infra text accompanying notes 201-

207.
186. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-57 (1976) (plaintiff
held to be private figure despite some arguable indicia of public figure status);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974) (Court agrees with
plantiff's argument that he was private figure).

187. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

188. See infra text accompanying notes 199-212, 226-243.
189. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
190. Id. at 351. Although Gertz appeared to allow for the possibility that
one might involuntarily become a public figure, see id., later decisions effectively extinguished that prospect, see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157, 166 (1979); Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454, 457. The Court's decisions have
left some uncertainty regarding what constitutes a public controversy for purposes of determining whether the plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure.
See Arlen W. Langvardt, MediaDefendants, Public Concerns, and PublicPlaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order From Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U.
PrTT.L. Rav. 91, 126 n.232 (1987) (discussing the semantic maze created by the
Court's uses of public controversy, public concern, and public interest in decisions that imply the existence of subtle differences among the terms but do not
clearly distinguish among them).
191. 418 U.S. at 342, 351-52. The Court observed that as compared to private figures, public figures have greater access to the media to counteract falsehoods. In addition, the Court noted that public figures effectively assume the
risk that falsehoods will sometimes be stated about them, and that private
figures are more vulnerable to reputational injury than public figures are. Id.
at 344-45.
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Supreme Court decisions passing on the public figure issue
demonstrate that the classification includes such persons as
political candidates, retired military generals, and well-known
former football coaches,' 9 2 but not, on the facts presented, a locally prominent private attorney, a wealthy socialite going
through a divorce, an alleged spy, or a recipient of government
research grants. 193 The fact-specific nature of the public figure
inquiry makes it difficult to generalize reliably about which parties will or will not be deemed public figures.
Cases brought by commercial plaintiffs magnify the difficulties inherent in the public figure determination. None of the
Supreme Court's public figure decisions, including Gertz, involved a commercial plaintiff or a commercial defendant; each
case arose in a noncommercial context.' 9 4 Although the Court
has decided three corporate plaintiff cases, it has never engaged
in a substantive public/private figure analysis in a suit involving
19 5
a commercial plaintiff, whether individual or corporate.
192. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657 (1989) (judicial candidate); Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971)
(political candidate); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (political candidate); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (former general); Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (former general); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (former football coach); see also Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (prominent television evangelist-political
leader held to be public figure).
193. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (attorney); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (socialite); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
443 U.S. 157 (1979) (alleged spy); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
(research grant recipient).
194. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (suit by attorney against magazine publisher
over falsehoods in magazine); see also supra notes 192-193 (citing cases involving nonbusiness plaintiffs against media defendants). For First Amendment
purposes, courts do not regard magazines, newspapers, and other media defendants as commercial speakers despite their underlying profit motive. Instead, their educational, informational, and entertainment functions normally
entitle such defendants to the full First Amendment protection accorded parties
engaged in noncommercial expression. See, e.g., HustlerMagazine, 485 U.S. 46;
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The noncommercial contexts of most of the Court's defamation decisions thus differ
from the necessarily commercial settings in which Lanham Act § 43(a)'s "commercial defamation" cases arise. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); supra text accompanying notes 71-80; infra notes 421-429.
195. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Although each
of these cases involved a corporate plaintiff, the Supreme Court did not rule on
the public/private figure issue. In Hepps, the private figure status of one of the
plaintiffs evidently was not in dispute. Without explanation or discussion, the
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Lower courts, however, have had occasion to decide defamation
19 6
actions brought by commercial (usually corporate) plaintiffs.
When making the public/private figure determination in these
197
cases, lower courts have struggled with the Gertz standards,
setting and are not well-suited
which arose in a noncommercial
98
to corporate plaintiff cases.'
Court referred to the corporate plaintiff as a private figure. See 475 U.S. at 769,
776. The Court acted the same way in Dun & Bradstreet. 472 U.S. at 751. In
Bose, the Court held that appellate review of a lower court's actual malice determination is to be conducted under the independent appellate review standard applicable to First Amendment cases, rather than according to the "clearly
erroneous" standard set by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
466 U.S. at 510-11, 514. Bose actually presented an injurious falsehood case of
the product disparagement variety, rather than a defamation case. See id. at
487-88. For a discussion of injurious falsehood cases, see supra text accompanying notes 116-124, 134-144. By the time Bose reached the Supreme Court,
the corporate plaintiff ceased contesting the trial court's conclusion that it was
a public figure, depriving the Court of an opportunity to address the issue. See
466 U.S. at 489-90, 492 n.8. The Court also accepted, without reviewing, the
lower courts' holdings that the public figure actual malice rule also applied in
an injurious falsehood suit brought by a public figure plaintiff. Id. at 513. For
additional discussion of Bose, see infra text accompanying notes 268-287.
196. See, e.g., Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 814 F.2d 775, 777
(1st Cir. 1987); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583,
589 (1st Cir. 1980); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 (3d Cir.
1980); National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 63443 (D. Md. 1992); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 1249, 1270-74 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), affd,
466 U.S. 485 (1984); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417
F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co.,
516 A 2d 220, 227 (N.J. 1986).
197. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 589; Steaks Unlimited, 623
F.2d at 274; National Life Ins., 793 F. Supp. at 634-43; Bose Corp., 508 F. Supp.
at 1270-74. See also Martin MariettaCorp., 417 F. Supp. at 955 (public figure
standards established in Gertz are ill-fitting in corporate plaintiff setting);
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220, 227 (N.J. 1986)
(same). For discussion and analysis of the difficulties associated with making
the public/private figure determination in a corporate plaintiff case, see generally Patricia N. Fetzer, The CorporateDefamation Plaintiffas FirstAmendment
"PublicFigure": Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. REV. 35 (1982).
198. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 960-62. Although Gertz's general purpose public figure classification would seemingly sweep in corporations whose
names are immediately recognizable (e.g., General Motors, IBM, etc.), whether
a given corporation possesses the notoriety necessary to warrant public figure
status is uncertain in most cases. The corporation's size may not be a particularly helpful predictor, in that the public may be more familiar with some relatively small corporations than many larger corporations whose name and
business are generally unknown. As for Gertz's limited-purpose public figure
classification-a classification that requires the plaintiff to assume a leadership
role in a public controversy-many corporations will avoid taking such roles in
a public controversy. Thus, the Gertz standards do not provide a realistic or
meaningful way of determining whether a corporate plaintiff is a public or pri-
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C. PRIVATE FIGURE PLAINTIFFS IN DEFAMATION CASES
Once the Supreme Court had formulated the constitutional
aspects of defamation actions brought by public plaintiffs, the
next major question was whether the First Amendment plays a
similar role in suits brought by private figure plaintiffs. After a
brief detour in which a plurality appeared to shift the determinative focus from the plaintiff's status to the degree of public
interest or concern present in the speech at issue, 19 9 the Court
resumed its prior course in Gertz. In this case, the Court answered the private figure question, holding that such cases indeed necessitate some allowance for First Amendment concerns
and that the plaintiff's status determines the appropriate extent
20
of accommodation.

0

1. Fault Requirement to Establish Liability
Concluding that private figure plaintiffs are both more vulnerable to reputational injury and more worthy of reputational
protection than public plaintiffs, the Gertz Court declined to extend to private figure plaintiffs the actual malice requirement
imposed on public plaintiffs. 20 1 Actual malice would be too stern
a standard to expect a private figure plaintiff to meet, given the
increased state interest in protecting such people's reputations
and the corresponding decrease in the defendant's expressive interests. 20 2 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that even the private figure setting dictates a need to insulate some makers of
false statements from liability in order to protect "speech that
matters. 2 0 3 The Court regarded defendants' competing First
vate figure. The standards fail to translate well into the commercial setting
which is normally present when a corporate plaintiff brings suit. See
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 961-62.

199. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971). The
plurality took the position that any defamation plaintiff must prove actual malice if the defendant's statement pertained to a matter of public interest or concern. Id. Gertz repudiated this position. See infra note 200.
200. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-48. In Gertz, the Court fashioned a fault requirement for private figure plaintiffs while preserving the actual malice requirement for public official and public figure plaintiffs. See id. at 343, 345-48. The
Court disapprovingly commented on Rosenbloon's public concern-oriented approach, appearing to reject it unequivocally. Id. at 346. In a later case, how-

ever, a Court plurality curiously reinterpreted Gertz as partially grounded in a
public concern rationale. See infra text accompanying notes 229-243.
201. 418 U.S. at 344-45. For other differences noted in Gertz between pri-

vate figures and public figures, see supra note 191.
202. See 418 U.S. at 342-45.
203. Id. at 341. See id. at 346-50. "Speech that matters" would logically

include true statements on a broad range of subjects. See New York Times Co.
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Amendment interests as sufficiently strong to justify a rule requiring private figure plaintiffs to prove some level of fault in
defamation cases. In other words, the First Amendment rendered the common law's strict liability approach constitutionally
20 4
impermissible.
Although the Court left the individual states free to determine what level of fault to require of private figure plaintiffs,20 5
it indicated that proof of the defendant's negligence-the failure
to use reasonable care to ascertain the statement's truth or falsity-would suffice.2 0 6 Indeed, after Gertz, nearly every state
chose negligence as the appropriate fault standard in private fig20 7
ure cases.
2. Restrictions on Presumed and Punitive Damages
Gertz's constitutionalization of private figure cases did not
stop with its announcement of a fault requirement. The Court
expressed concern about juries' "largely uncontrolled discretion"
to assess presumed and punitive damages under the common
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264, 267-68, 271-72 (1964) (discussing the need to
protect some makers of false statements from liability in order to prevent chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms).
204. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (which some read as having resurrected strict liability for the private figure/private concern cases). See also infra
note 236 (discussing method of reading Dun & Bradstreet). For discussion of
the common law's strict liability approach, see supra text accompanying notes
109-110.
205. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48.
206. See id. at 350; see also id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (so reading
the majority opinion). In the course of requiring private figure plaintiffs to
prove fault, the Court did not expressly require them to prove the falsity of the
defendant's statement. See id. at 347-48, 350. The court later substantially
resolved the proof-of-falsity issue. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767 (1986). In Hepps, the Court held that a private figure plaintiff must
prove falsity, at least when the defendant's statement was on a matter of public
concern and the defendant was a member of the media. Id. at 768-69, 777. The
narrowness of the Hepps holding may leave a small range of cases in which the
plaintiff may not be expected to prove falsity. There are sound arguments, however, for making all defamation plaintiffs prove falsity (as opposed to presuming falsity and requiring the defendant to prove truth). See Langvardt, supra
note 190, at 110-14. Under Lanham Act § 43(a), there is no comparable burden
of proof question. With a false or misleading statement being a statutory element of a § 43(a) claim, the plaintiff logically carries the burden of proving that
element. See id. For discussion of § 43(a) claims, see supra text accompanying
notes 47-100.
207. Langvardt, supra note 190, at 98 n.50, citing Note, Private Lives and
Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 51 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 425, 425-26 (1985).
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law. 20 8 The potentially enormous damages possible under this
scheme, the Court reasoned, could chill the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. 20 9 Therefore, the Court placed First
Amendment-based limits on presumed and punitive damages by
holding that if the private figure plaintiff established only the
minimum level of fault (usually negligence) necessary to prevail,
he or she would be restricted to compensatory damages for
proven "actual injury."2 10 Although Gertz seemed to contemplate a fairly broad construction of "actual injury,"2 11 requiring
proof thereof departed significantly from the common law
approach.
In requiring proof of actual injury as the basis for awarding
damages when the private figure plaintiff proves only the minimum level of fault necessary to prevail, Gertz did not wholly invalidate the common law's presumed damages doctrine. The
Court held that if the private figure plaintiff proved actual malice (though not required to do so in order to establish liability),
would not bar an award of presumed and
the First Amendment
2 12
damages.
punitive
3.

Media-Nonmedia Issue

For several years after Gertz, the Supreme Court's defamation decisions usually centered around familiar questions such
as whether a given plaintiff was a public figure or whether the
defendant displayed actual malice.2 13 A question, however,
lingered: whether the constitutional rules announced in Gertz
208.

418 U.S. at 349; see id. at 350.

209. Id. at 349-50. The Court noted that allowing a plaintiff to recover damages in excess of actual injury-at least where the plaintiff only demonstrated
negligence-sweeps farther than the state interest in protecting the plaintiffs
reputation justifies. Id. at 349. According to the Court, the common law's allowance of presumed damages in certain cases may give juries the ability to
punish unpopular opinion. Id. The court stressed that "the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury." Id. As for punitive damages, the Court stated that they are "wholly irrelevant to the state
interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.
They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."
Id. at 350.
210. Id. at 349-50. The Court has limited this Gertz rule to private figure
plaintiff cases implicating matters of public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). For discussion of
Dun & Bradstreet,see infra text accompanying notes 229-243.
211. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.

212. Id. at 349-50.
213. E.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson
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(and its forerunners, New York Times and Butts) applied in all
defamation cases, or only in those brought against media defendants. The Court's prior decisions left room for argument on
both sides of that question. 2 14 The Court appeared poised to resolve the issue in 1985, when it decided Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 2 15 Instead, a plurality expressly
avoided the media-nonmedia issue, disposing of the case on different grounds. 2 16 An examination of the concurring and dissenting opinions in Dun & Bradstreet reveals, however, that if
the issue had been squarely presented, a majority would have
rejected a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants
in terms of defamation's constitutional limitations. 21 7 The
Court thus seemed to unofficially resolve the media-nonmedia
question, despite the plurality's express avoidance of it.
Curiously, however, the Court has since employed mediaoriented language when stating its holdings or restating previously adopted rules, while declining to express a definite view on
the distinction's validity.2 18 The issue remains alive, particularly in light of the Court's new composition since it decided Dun
2 19 The better view, according to most commenta& Bradstreet.
tors, holds that in light of the First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech and press, defamation's constitutional constraints
regardless of whether the defendant is a member of
should apply
22 0
the media.
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
214. See Langvardt, supra note 190, at 99-100, 115-17.
215. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
216. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 753. For discussion of the basis on
which the Court resolved the case, see infra text accompanying notes 221-254.
217. Concurring, Justice White indicated that he would not favor a media
and non-media distinction. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Dissenting, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens also expressed disapproval of a media and non-media distinction.
Id. at 781-83 (Brennan, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
218. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 n.6 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
219. Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas were not on the Court when it decided Dun & Bradstreet,and have not taken an identifiable position on the media and non-media issue.
220. See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 190, at 117-23; Patrick J. McNulty, The
Gertz Fault Standard and the Common Law of Defamation: An Argument for
Predictabilityof Result and Certainty of Expectation, 35 DRAEs L. REv. 51, 83
(1985); Anthony Lewis, A PreferredPositionfor Journalism?,7 HoFsTm&L. REV.
595, 597 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First
Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. Rav. 915, 922-23, 928 n.109, 935 (1978).
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ROLE OF PUBLIC CONCERN DETERMINATIONS IN
DEFAMATION CASES BROUGHT BY PRIVATE FIGURE

PLAn-rrwFS

1. The Dun & Bradstreet Case: Background
Dun & Bradstreet was the Supreme Court's first true defa-

mation case involving a commercial plaintiff.2 2 1 Although the

case had been expected to resolve the media-nonmedia issue, a
plurality instead used it to place a public concern limitation on
part, if not all, of the Gertz approach to private figure cases. 22 2
A proper understanding of Dun & Bradstreet necessitates a
thorough examination of its factual background.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a small, closely-held corporation,
sued Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) after a D&B credit report, issued
to five paying subscribers, 223 falsely stated that Greenmoss had
filed for bankruptcy. The parties did not seriously dispute that
the untrue statement about Greenmoss resulted from D&B's
negligence. 22 4 The same evidently was true of the public-private
figure issue, as the Court summarily labeled Greemnoss a pri2 25
vate figure.
With falsity, defamatory nature, publication, the plaintiffs
private figure status and the defendant's negligence as "givens"
here, it would seem that Gertz would have limited Greenmoss to
See also RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. e (1977) (expressing
view that constitutional aspects of defamation law should apply in media and
non-media defendant cases). The fundamental lack of soundness attending a
media and non-media distinction relates to the issues dealt with in this article,
in that the lack of media defendants in § 43(a) cases provides no basis for asserting that First Amendment interests need not be accommodated in such
cases. For this article's proposed First Amendment considerations and framework to guide § 43(a) cases, see infra text accompanying notes 399-461.
221. The plaintiff, Greenmoss Builders, Inc., was a construction contractor.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751. Although Bose also involved a corporate
plaintiff, it actually presented an injurious falsehood case rather than a defamation case. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984); supra note 195.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 229-243.
223. 472 U.S. at 751-52.
224. A D&B employee erroneously copied court records, which showed that
a Greenmoss employee (rather that Greenmoss itself) had declared bankruptcy.
Although D&B had a policy of verifying the accuracy of such information before
including it in a credit report, D&B failed to check with Greenmoss in this instance. Id. at 751-52. Negligence, though not actual malice, was thus clearly
present. See id; see also id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
parties did not question "the requirement of Gertz that [the plaintiff] must show
fault to obtain a judgment and actual damages"). D&B later issued a corrective
notice to the five subscribers, but Greenmoss filed suit anyway. Id. at 752.
225. Id. at 751.
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damages for proven actual injury. 22 6 Greenmoss, however,
failed to prove actual injury. The jury nonetheless awarded
$50,000 in presumed damages and another $300,000 in punitive
damages. The trial judge had failed to adequately instruct the
jury on the Gertz rules requiring proof of injury when the plaintiff proves only negligence, and proof of actual malice as a pre2 27
requisite to an award of presumed or punitive damages.
Thus, both the jury verdict and the trial judge's failure to give
damages instructions in accordance with Gertz seemed erroneous-unless Gertz was somehow inapplicable.
Although the trial judge later granted a new trial, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that Gertz applied only
to cases against media defendants. D&B did not satisfy this criand
terion. Thus, the court reasoned, the award of presumed
228
punitive damages to Greenmoss was permissible.
2. Dun & Bradstreet'sModification of Gertz
The Dun & Bradstreet plurality expressly avoided resolution of the media-nonmedia issue, and affirmed the Vermont
Supreme Court on other grounds.2 2 9 Justice Powell's plurality
opinion modified Gertz by injecting a public concern element into
at least part of Gertz's status-of-the-plaintiff approach to private
figure cases. In doing so, however, Justice Powell disingenuously denied that his opinion altered Gertz in any respect, asserting instead that a public concern element had been present
2 30
all along.
A fair reading of Gertz, which Justice Powell also authored,
reveals that it confined its discussion of "public concern" to a rejection of a previous decision which used a public concern test to
trigger the actual malice rule.23 1 Gertz premised its formulation
226. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
227. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 752.
228. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 461 A.2d 414,41718 (Vt. 1983), affd 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
229. 472 U.S. at 753.
230. See id. at 755-61, 757 n.4.
231. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337-39, 345-46. In Gertz, the Court rejected the
rationale presented by Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In
Rosenbloom, a plurality concluded that the actual malice rule applied in any
case in which the statement about the plaintiff (whether public figure or private
figure) was one of public interest or concern. Id. at 43-44. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Gertz called the Rosenbloom approach insufficiently accommodating of the legitimate state interest in allowing a legal remedy for
reputational harm to private figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. The Court also
objected to Rosenbloom's rationale because it would lead to "adhoc" determina-
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of constitutional rules for private figure cases on a single factor:
the presence of a private figure plaintiff.2 32 Nonetheless, Justice Powell opened his Dun & Bradstreet opinion by observing
that Gertz "held that the First Amendment restricted the damages that a private individual could obtain from a publisher for a
libel that involved a matter ofpublic concern."2 33 Noting Gertz's
holding that presumed and punitive damages are not recoverable absent a showing of actual malice, Justice Powell framed
the issue in Dun & Bradstreetas "whether this rule of Gertz applies when the false and defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern." 23 4 The three Justices forming the

plurality, plus two who concurred in the judgment, answered
235
this question with a "no."
To justify a public concern inquiry, at least as to the presumed and punitive damages issues in private figure plaintiff
cases, 23 6 the plurality noted that all of the Court's previous defamation decisions had involved "public issues," and that Gertz
arose in such a context. 2 37 Justice Powell observed that "not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance." 238 To illustrate, he cited the First Amendment status of commercial
tions of what constituted public interest or concern. Id. Justice Powell expressed "doubt [about] the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of
judges." Id.
232. See 418 U.S. at 346-50; see also Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 785 n.11
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that "[olne searches Gertz in vain for a single word to support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only when speech involved matters of public concern"); id. at 772
(White, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting his impression that "the decision in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false statements of
fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement is made privately or publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of public importance").
233. 472 U.S. at 751 (emphasis supplied).
234. Id. (emphasis supplied).
235. Id. at 761, 763; see id. at 765 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
236. Limiting the public concern requirement to the presumed and punitive
damages aspects of private figure plaintiff cases reads Dun & Bradstreet narrowly. This reading stems primarily from Justice Powell's strict framing (at
least initially) of the questions as damages issues, see supra text accompanying
note 234, and from the fact that the plaintiff had demonstrated negligence, see
supra note 224. Thus, the Court did not actually decide the question whether
the basic fault requirement, requiring a minimum showing of negligence, operates in a private figure/private concern case. An equally plausible reading of
Dun & Bradstreet,however, classifies it as placing a public concern gloss on
each aspect of Gertz. See 472 U.S. at 773-74 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
237. Id. at 755-56.
238. Id. at 758.
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speech, which he termed "protected speech, [but] the most prominent example of reduced protection for certain kinds of
2 39

speech."

The Dun & Bradstreetplurality then distinguished between
speech on matters of public concern and private concern, deeming the former of core First Amendment significance and the latter of "less First Amendment concern." 240 Justice Powell
conceded that expression on matters of private concern "is not
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment," but emphasized
that in such cases the "protections are less stringent."24 1 The
plurality concluded that in a private figure defamation case involving a statement of private concern, "the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited" than when
statements on matters of public concern are at issue.2 42 Dun &
Bradstreetthus held that "[i]n light of the reduced constitutional
value of speech involving no matters of public concern,.., the
state interest [in allowing presumed and punitive damages] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages2 43
even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'"
3.

Dun & Bradstreet'sPublic/Private Concern Determination

Having formulated the damages rule, Justice Powell turned
to the proper classification of the expression at issue. The plurality concluded that the public/private concern issue should be
determined by examining the speech's "content, form, and context... as revealed by the whole record."24 With little explana239. Id. at 758 n.5. For additional discussion of the commercial speech analogy drawn in Dun & Bradstreet,see infra text accompanying notes 247-257,
375-383.
240. 472 U.S. at 758-59. The Court asserted that legal restrictions on
speech of private concern would neither seriously threaten free debate nor raise
dangers of self-censorship. See id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Or. 1977).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 759. The plurality's statement indicates that the Constitution
continues to play some role in the private figure/concern defamation case,
though a more limited role than in the private/public concern case. Elsewhere
in the plurality opinion, however, Justice Powell implied that the private figure/
concern scenario might not be subject to constitutional constraints. See id. at
761 n.7.
243. Id. at 761. In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that even in a private
figure/concern case, the allowance of presumed and punitive damages absent a
showing of actual malice was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the government interest in affording a remedy for harm to private figures' reputations.
See id. at 793-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
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tion of how to apply this unenlightening test, the plurality
classified the offending credit report as a matter of only private
concern. 2 45 In view of the gloss already placed on Gertz's presumed and punitive damages rule, the Court upheld the jury's
award of presumed and punitive damages even though Greenmoss had not shown actual malice. 24 6
Justice Powell restricted his comments on the public/private
concern determination to an analogy to the First Amendment
treatment of commercial speech. He characterized the credit report as "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its
specific business audience" and asserted that "[t]his particular
interest warrants no special protection when, as in this case, the
speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim's business reputation." 2 47 He also noted that in view of the credit report's limited circulation-to only five subscribers who were
contractually bound not to disseminate it further-the facts did
not involve a "'strong interest in the free flow of commercial
24 8
information."
Continuing the commercial speech analogy, Justice Powell
reasoned that "the speech here, like advertising, is hardy and
unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation." 24 9 The
245. See id. at 762. For a strong argument that Dun & Bradstreetinvolved
speech on a matter of public concern, see id. at 786-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 763. This holding had the unusual effect of allowing punitive
damages on a showing of mere negligence. For a discussion of the negligence
present in Dun & Bradstreet,see supra note 224. Tort law generally declines to
award punitive damages when the plaintiff has only shown negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 & cmt. b (1977).

247. 472 U.S. at 762. Perhaps the Dun & Bradstreet credit report's very

limited circulation, coupled with the confidentiality requirement imposed on
the five paying subscribers, id. at 751, accounted for the Court's comment that
the expression at issue was "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience," id. at 762. This rationale should not lead to a
conclusion that all commercial expression merits only private concern analysis,
even though the Court drew an analogy to the commercial speech setting. Most
commercial advertising would have neither the limited circulation of the D&B
credit report nor the confidentiality obligations imposed on the subscribers. For
additional discussion of the notion that commercial expression may be of either
public or private concern, see infra text accompanying notes 255-276, 375-383.
Although the Dun & Bradstreetplurality labeled the credit report at issue
"clearly damaging to the victim's reputation," 472 U.S. at 762, the plaintiff apparently did not attempt to prove actual damage in this regard. The court
awarded only presumed and punitive damages. See id. at 751-55.
248. Id. at 762 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
249. Id. at 762. The Court had cited such a factor in a non-defamation decision to justify giving commercial speech less-than-full First Amendment protection. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
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profit motive underlying the credit report, coupled with creditors' desires for accurate information, made such expression unlikely to be chilled by regulation. 250 Finally, the plurality
emphasized that the credit report was "more objectively verifiable"2 5 1 than fully protected speech, again invoking a previously
extending less-than-full protection to
expressed rationale25 for
2
commercial speech.
Notwithstanding the commercial speech analogy, Justice
Powell emphasized that the plurality was:
not hold[ing]... that the [credit] report is subject to reduced constitutional protection because it constitutes economic or commercial speech.
We discuss such speech, along with advertising, only to show how
constitumany of the same concerns that argue in favor of2 5reduced
3
tional protection in those areas apply here as well.

In addition, he denied that Dun & Bradstreetrelegated all credit
reporting to a status of partial First Amendment protection.
Justice Powell asserted, instead, that the content, form, and conthat certain credit reports
text test allowed for the 2prospect
54
could be of public concern.
4.

Commercial Speech, Expression on Economic Matters, and
Public Concern Treatment for Defamation Purposes

Presumably, then, if the credit report that gave rise to Dun
& Bradstreetwas not commercial speech, and if particular credit
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). It is questionable, however, whether
government sanctioned actions for substantial damages constitute only "incidental state regulation." See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 762. These actions,
as will be seen, can produce a substantial chilling effect. See infra text accompanying notes 409-420.
250. 472 U.S. at 762-63. It is unclear whether this holds true in the context
of potentially huge damage awards. If the damages potentially available to a
prospective plaintiff were quite large, a speaker (the prospective defendant)
driven by a profit-motive might conclude that the costs of engaging in certain
expression might be so great as to prevent the making of a profit. Therefore,
the speaker might decide to forego the expression, producing a chilling effect.
For additional discussion of the chilling effect of potentially large damage
awards, see infra text accompanying notes 409-420.
251. 472 U.S. at 762. The plurality offered no evidence supporting this allegedly greater degree of verifiability. Accepting the plurality's assumption
that the credit report at least resembled commercial advertising, see id. at 76263, it is unclear whether commercial advertising, as a class, is any more or less
objectively verifiable than those statements, made in a non-advertising context,
that trigger full First Amendment protection.
252. For discussion ofthe cases in which the Court has addressed the degree
of First Amendment protection it affords commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes 301-345, 399-420.
253. 472 U.S. at 762 n.8.
254. Id.
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reports may be of either public or private concern depending
upon the facts, Dun & Bradstreet should not be read as indicating that commercial speech is automatically of only private concern. Some courts, however, seem to have read Dun &
Bradstreetin such a fashion.2 5 5 Although the result in Dun &
Bradstreetmay stem from a questionable application of an "impoverished" notion of what constitutes a matter of public concern, 2 56 the case does not preclude the conclusion that
commercial speech, as well as other expression arising in economic contexts, may be of either public or private concern, depending again upon the relevant facts.2 5 7
The Supreme Court's defamation cases bolster this conclusion, despite the noncommercial contexts in which they generally arose. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 58 emphasized the
importance of examining the substance, rather than the form, of
the relevant statement. In this case, the Court held that the defendants' statements, which appeared in a paid advertisement,
were fully protected statements on public issues. 25 9 The Court
declined to label the statements as matters of mere private concern even though the individual defendants paid for the newspaper space, a normal attribute of commercial advertising, and the
newspaper defendant received this payment-thus manifesting
a profit motive-for publishing the advertisement. 2 60
Similarly, in CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts, 2 6 1 Chief Justice
Warren's controlling concurrence included various statements
with a commercial ring to them, even though Butts did not arise
in a commercial setting.2 62 Commenting on the similarities between public officials and public figures, the overlap between
government and the private sector and apparently matters of
255. See infra text accompanying notes 375-383, 391-395.
256. 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
257. This conclusion will be justified not only in immediately following portions of the text but also in later portions of the article. See infratext accompanying notes 258-276, 375-390, 402-407, 433-451.
258. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
259. Id. at 256-59, 265-66.
260. See id. at 256, 265-66. For additional discussion of New York Times'
factual context and the Court's refusal to afford the expression at issue there
less-than-full First Amendment protection, see supra text accompanying notes
159-162. See also supra notes 160-161 (examining further the nature of the
speech at issue in New York Times); infra note 304 (discussing other cases in
which Supreme Court has established that presence of underlying profit motive
does not automatically make expression commercial in nature).
261. 388 U.S. 130, 162-170 (1967) (Warren, C.J. concurring).
262. For discussion of the context in which Butts arose, see supra note 179.
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public concern, 263 the Chief Justice noted the "rapid fusion of
economic and political power," the "merging of science, industry,
and government," the interaction between government and business, the emergence of "national and international markets,"
264
and the role of corporations in helping to shape public policy.
It would appear, therefore, that the Court allowed considerable
room for statements about commercial matters to fall within the
realm of public concern.2 65 If, as in Butts, statements about the
alleged fixing of a football game are of public concern, 2 66 the
same should certainly be true of a wide range of statements
including many that appear in
made in the business setting,
2 67
commercial advertising.
In a 1984 decision, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.,268 the Court offered further indications that a broad
range of speech about commercial issues and parties may fall
263. See 388 U.S. at 162-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
264. Id. at 163. Chief Justice Warren's comments are relevant to this article's proposed First Amendment framework for Lanham Act § 43(a) cases. As
will be seen, that framework partially turns on a public/private concern distinction applied within the commercial context encountered in § 43(a) cases. See
infra text accompanying notes 439-451.
265. Although Butts thus recognized the importance of expression with economic and business connections, it should be noted that at that time, the
Supreme Court had not yet formally extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech. The Court did not explicitly hold that commercial speech
merited some First Amendment protection until 1976. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-72
(1976). For discussion of Virginia Board of Pharmacy and the Court's other
major commercial speech decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 301-345.
266. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 135-36; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-56 (1985) (noting that each of the Court's
previous defamation decisions had involved statements on matters of public
concern).
267. Similarly, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), the
Court noted that "the First Amendment extends to myriad matters of public
interest." Id. at 42. The Court held the "public interest" classification to include the allegations giving rise to Rosenbloom: that the plaintiff sold obscene
magazines. Id. at 32-34, 41-43. Surely much speech on business and economicrelated matters-even much commercial advertising-is equally significant.
Although the Court later repudiated Rosenbloom's holding that even a private
figure plaintiff must prove actual malice in order to win a defamation case involving a matter of public interest or concern, see supra note 199, the Court has
continued to recognize the importance of granting meaningful First Amendment protection to statements of public concern, see supra text accompanying
notes 229-243. As a result, Rosenbloom's comments on what constitutes a matter of public interest or concern assume a continued significance. For discussion of the importance of making public/private concern distinctions in Lanham
Act § 43(a) cases that arise in the context of commercial advertising or similar
expression, see infra text accompanying notes 377-392, 402-453.
268. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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under the public concern umbrella. Although Bose technically
was a case of injurious falsehood rather than defamation, 2 69 the
Court used it to resolve issues surrounding the independent appellate review standard which the First Amendment mandates
regarding lower court determinations of actual malice.2 7 0 The
falsehood at issue pertained to characteristics of the plaintiff
corporation's stereo speakers.2 7 1 The Court's use of Bose to clarify important First Amendment issues, coupled with its implicit
characterization of the case in Dun & Bradstreet,leads to the
conclusion that the Court regarded the statement in Bose as one
of public concern. 27 2 The defendant in Bose was a consumer
magazine2 7 3 containing a statement that did not constitute commercial speech. The same statement, if made today by a consumer magazine, would not be actionable under the new section
43(a).2 74 New York Times, however, requires a focus on the substance of what was said, rather than the form in which it was
said. 27 5 Thus, a statement identical to that in Bose, if made by
the plaintiffs competitor in an advertisement for its product,
should still be a statement of public concern even though it
would be commercial speech actionable under the new section
2 76
43(a).
E.

CoNsTITuTIoNAL ASPECTS OF INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD

The foregoing discussion of Bose, an injurious falsehood
269. Id. at 487.
270. Id. at 499, 510-11, 514. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 284-86 (1964).
271. Bose, 466 U.S. at 487-88.
272. In Dun & Bradstreet, the plurality stated that "every other case in
which this Court has found constitutional limits to state defamation laws...
involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern." 472 U.S. at 756.
Even though Bose technically presented an injurious falsehood case, the Court
effectively treated it as a defamation case in terms of the appropriate standard
of independent appellate review. See supra text accompanying notes 269-270.
Bose thus would logically be one of the "public concern" cases to which the D&B
plurality referred.
273. Bose, 466 U.S. at 487-88.
274. The defendant's magazine article-a critical review of a stereo speaker
system--did not propose a commercial transaction and, therefore, was not commercial speech. See infra text accompanying notes 301-305. If made today,
similar statements would not be actionable under Lanham Act § 43(a) because
they are not made in the context of commercial advertising or promotion. See
supra notes 78-79.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 159-161, 268-260.
276. See infratext accompanying notes 301-305; supra notes 78-79; cf. supra
note 274 (explaining why actual facts of Bose are not commercial speech, and
not actionable under present § 43(a)).
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case, leads logically to a brief consideration of the constitutional
aspects of that common law action. It is important to note at the
outset that the Supreme Court has not crafted a special set of
constitutional requirements for injurious falsehood cases.
One might even argue, after a technical parsing of Bose,
that the Court has not imposed any serious First Amendment
limits on injurious falsehood. After all, the Court expressly
avoided deciding whether the plaintiff corporation in Bose was a
public figure. 2 77 Similarly, the Court declined to state whether
defamation's actual malice requirement applies to injurious
falsehood as well. 278 Instead, the Court uncritically accepted the
lower courts' approach to these issues, and proceeded to consider
279
the independent appellate review issue.
Nevertheless, the Court's choice of Bose as the vehicle for
addressing a major First Amendment question arising in defamation cases makes it reasonably apparent that injurious falsehood law cannot go unchecked by the First Amendment. 28 0
Although the Court has not authoritatively detailed the constitutional aspects of injurious falsehood, it would be difficult, after
Bose, for the Court to deem injurious falsehood unaffected by
28 1
freedom of expression concerns.
Lower courts have tended to read Bose as indicating that
freedom of expression concerns must be accommodated in injurious falsehood cases. 28 2 The courts have differed, however, concerning the proper approach to the constitutionalization of
injurious falsehood law. 28 3 A number of courts have taken defa277. Bose, 466 U.S. at 492 n.8.
278. Id. at 513.
279. Id. at 492 n.8, 513. The Court held that appellate review of lower
courts' determinations of actual malice must be conducted according to an independent review of the entire record rather than under the "clearly erroneous"
standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 510-11, 514.
280. If the Court did not regard injurious falsehood law as raising at least
some of the freedom of expression concerns defamation law presents, Bose
would have been a completely unsatisfactory vehicle for addressing the First
Amendment issues decided there.
281. Even though the Court acknowledged that Bose's central issue "reaches
us on a somewhat peculiar wavelength," 466 U.S. at 514, an understandable
signal derived from Bose is that the First Amendment must sometimes constrain injurious falsehood law.
282. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977); id. caveats (1), (2)
& cmts. c, d.
283. See id. This is due in part to the lack of a definitive ruling from the
Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying notes 277-281. There is another
possible explanation for the differences among courts on the proper approach to
the constitutionalization of injurious falsehood law: the longstanding differences among states on what is necessary to satisfy injurious falsehood's com-
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mation's public/private figure approach and transplanted it into
the injurious falsehood realm. 28 4 Whether that approach is the

best course of action remains open to debate.28 5 For present
purposes, however, it suffices to say that the interests at stake
in injurious falsehood cases, although not identical to those in
defamation litigation,28 6 are sufficiently28 7similar to warrant
meaningful First Amendment protection.
Any attempt to craft a First Amendment framework for Section 43(a) cases obviously implicates the constitutional dimensions of defamation and injurious falsehood. Consideration of
these constitutional rules, however, does not end the First
Amendment inquiry. Although the Supreme Court's defamation
decisions have occasionally touched upon commercial matters,
the Court defined defamation's constitutional parameters for the
mon law requirement of proof of fault. Although the common law of the various
states has tended to agree that an injurious falsehood plaintiff must establish
the defendant's fault, see KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 969, different
states have required different showings in this regard. Some have required
proof of the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
See, e.g., Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 742, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 623A
(1977). This is the same degree of fault the actual malice standard contemplates, except by common law. Other states, however, have required what may
be called common law malice-ill will or spite motives toward the plaintiff. See,
e.g., Systems Operations, v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1140
(3d Cir. 1977). Still other states have required proof of the defendant's intent to
cause economic harm. See RESTATEMENT, supra, § 623A caveats (1), (2). Complicating matters further, some states allow the plaintiff to establish the requisite fault by proving any of the forms of fault just discussed. See, e.g., Annbar
Assocs. v. American Express Co, 565 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. App. 1978).
284. See, e.g., Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 814 F.2d 775, 777
(1st Cir. 1987); Blatty v. New York Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1181, 1182-83
(Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 394 (1988); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub.
Co., 486 A.2d 344, 345 (N.J. Super. 1985), affid on other grounds, 516 A.2d 220
(N.J. 1986). These courts borrowed the defamation scheme at least to the extent that public figure plaintiffs are expected to prove actual malice. Negligence-the fault requirement that private figure plaintiffs must establish in
defamation cases-generally has not been seen as an appropriate type or level
of fault to sustain an injurious falsehood claim. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 623A cmt. d.

285. For instance, it may be argued that the constitutional aspects of injurious falsehood law should utilize the fault concepts of negligence and actual malice, but that the applicable fault requirement should be triggered by factors
other than the plaintiffs status (the approach taken in defamation law). Under
this proposal, the fault requirement in a given injurious falsehood case would
be determined according to the nature of the speech at issue and the defendant's status. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 959-75.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 125-153.
287. See Bose, 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270-74 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), affd, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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most part in noncommercial cases. 28 8 Section 43(a) "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" cases, on the other hand, arise in
commercial settings. 2 9 It therefore becomes relevant to consider the line of Supreme Court decisions delineating the scope
of First Amendment protection enjoyed by commercial speech.
V. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Although the Court has come to regard the First Amendment as protecting a broad range of expression, 2 90 it does not
extend to all speech. 2 91 The Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence establishes, moreover, that not every protected
category of expression merits the same degree of insulation from
government regulation. 29 2 The commercial/noncommercial disdesigtinction is the primary means by which the Court has
2 93
nated different levels of First Amendment protection.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 194-198, 255-276; infra text accompanying notes 421-432.
289. Such section 43(a) cases must arise in the context of "commercial advertising or promotion." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
290. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-59 (1985).
291. For instance, obscene expression falls outside the First Amendment's
protective scope. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). The First Amendment also leaves unprotected speech designed to incite, and likely to incite, imminent lawless activity. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curium). The same apparently is true of so-called "fighting words," those statements whose utterance inflicts injury or tends to provoke an immediate violent
response. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The
Supreme Court has recently emphasized, however, that even within these unprotected classifications of speech such as fighting words, the government may
not make content-based discriminations among different types of fighting
words. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
292. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 757-62.
293. Since Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme Court has held that commercial
speech merits an intermediate level of First Amendment protection rather than
the full protection accorded political speech and other forms of noncommercial
expression. See, e.g., id. at 770-72. For additional discussion of the commercial/
noncommercial distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence, see infra text accompanying notes 294-345. The Court has also indicated that speech on a matter of public concern merits greater First Amendment protection than speech of
private concern. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 758-60. The Court has not
clearly enunciated, however, many specifics differentiating between these relative degrees of protection.
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FULL PROTECTION FOR NONCOMMERCIAL EXPRESSION

Noncommercial expression on a whole host of subjects merits "full" First Amendment protection. 29 4 Although this label
does not mean that the government may never constitutionally
regulate such speech, it does mean that the government will face
considerable difficulty sustaining a content-based restriction
against a First Amendment attack. 29 5 Political speech 29 6 serves
expresas the best example of fully protected noncommercial
29 7
sion, given its "core" First Amendment status.
The First Amendment protects much more than political
speech, however. Other noncommercial expression receives the
same constitutional solicitude given to political speech. 29 8 The
Supreme Court has extended full First Amendment protection
to "expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, lit294. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850 (1992) (political
speech); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508-09 (1991) (expression on matters of crime); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (expressive conduct of a political nature);
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-68,
271-72, 278-79 (1964) (expression dealing with major social issues).
295. In order for a court to uphold a content-based regulation of fully protected speech, the regulation must be necessary to the fulfillment of a compelling government purpose. See, e.g., Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1851; Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 318, 321 (1988). This stern "strict scrutiny" test means that the
content-based government restriction usually falls. See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at
1857 ("reaffirm[ing] that it is the rare case in which we have held that a law
survives strict scrutiny"). For examples of the strict scrutiny tests ultimate
effect (i.e., the government restriction's nullification on First Amendment
grounds), see Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510-12; Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 412 (1989). Burson, however, is an example of the "rare case" in
which a government restriction on fully protected speech passes the strict scrutiny test. 112 S. Ct. at 1857-58.
296. The political speech classification logically includes statements about
government operations, significant social and public policy issues, and individuals connected with such matters. See, e.g., Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1850; Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56
(1988); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978); New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 269-71.
297. See, e.g., Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1850; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406;
Boos, 485 U.S. at 318; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 759 (1985); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-86.
298. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510-12 (book authored by
criminal); Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46 (parody of public figure); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (theatrical production);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (issues of public concern);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazine article about play); Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (works of literature); Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movie).
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erary, or ethical matters-to take a non-exhaustive list of labels."2 99 In addition, the Court has indicated that speech on
is a highly valued commodity for First
matters of public concern
30 0
Amendment purposes.

B.

INTERMEDIATE PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH

1. The Direct Regulation Context
The Court has not extended full First Amendment protection, however, to commercial speech3 0 1 when the government
seeks to restrict it by direct regulation, as opposed to the indirect but significant regulation found in judicial enforcement of
legal rules allowing private parties to bring civil actions for
damages. 3 0 2 Although it has sometimes defined "commercial
speech" as expression that is solely in the economic interest of
the speaker and his audience, 30 3 the Supreme Court usually defines it as expression that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."3 0 4 As a result, the Court typically treats
299. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). That an economic motive underlies the expression does not necessarily deprive it of its fully
protected character. See infra note 304.
300. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 758-60. The Court has not clearly stated
whether all speech on matters of public concern merits full protection. Except
for defamation cases brought by private figure plaintiffs, see id. at 759-61, the
Court has not specified what level of protection the First Amendment requires
for noncommercial speech of only private concern. Nor has the Court expressly
ruled whether commercial speech may sometimes fall within the public concern
category. See supra text accompanying notes 254-256. This article posits that
commercial speech may be of either public or private concern. See supra text
accompanying notes 254-276; infra text accompanying notes 375-386, 433-449.
301. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-72 (1976).
302. The term "direct regulation" refers to government regulations (usually
statutes or agency rules) that proscribe or restrict expression and are enforced
in government-initiated proceedings for injunctive relief, restitutionary relief,
or other administrative sanctions. The direct regulation setting existed in each
of the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions discussed in this subsection. See infra text accompanying notes 303-344. The term "indirect regulation," on the other hand, refers to judicial enforcement of legal rules allowing
private parties to sue for damages. Defamation, injurious falsehood, and Lanham Act § 43(a) claims would thus be of the indirect regulation variety. Use of
the term "indirect regulation" does not mean that this sort of regulation has
insignificant effects on the speaker. As indicated later, see infra text accompanying notes 411-418, indirect regulation may pose more severe adverse First
Amendment consequences than direct regulation. For additional discussion of
the importance of distinguishing between direct and indirect regulation in the
context of commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes 408-420.
303. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
304. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pitts-
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advertising intended to promote the sale of a product or service
as commercial speech. Indeed, the Court's commercial speech
decisions have consistently involved advertising which the government sought to regulate directly under statutes or rules banning or restricting expression of a certain content.3 0 5
The Court has not decided a commercial speech case involving indirect government regulation through a private party's legally authorized suit for damages. The Court's defamation cases
occasionally touched upon related issues but were ultimately
held not to involve commercial speech.3 0 6 The direct regulationindirect regulation distinction drawn here must be kept in mind
speech decisions,
during examination of the Court's commercial
307
each of which involved direct regulation.
2. Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Its Effect
Even though commercial speech does not receive full First
Amendment protection, its present constitutional status is a
burgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Regardless of which definition of commercial speech is employed, it is clear that
the speaker's profit motive will not alone suffice to make the speech commercial
in nature. Various Supreme Court decisions establish that an underlying profit
motive does not lessen the degree of constitutional protection extended to that
expression. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 667 (1989); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750,756 n.5 (1988); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Speech as
to which there is a profit motive is not necessarily solely in the economic interest of the speaker and his audience. Neither does it necessarily propose a commercial transaction. Therefore, such expression is not automatically
commercial speech under either of the commercial speech definitions set forth
in the text. See supra text accompanying notes 303-304.
305. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (restriction on advertisements for gambling casinos); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (restriction on unsolicited mailings of
contraceptive advertisements and promotional materials); Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. 557 (restriction on advertisements by utility companies); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. 748 (restriction on pharmacists'
ability to advertise prescription drug prices). None of these cases arose in the
context of a private plaintiffs suit for damages.
306. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Dun & Bradstreet, the plurality drew an analogy between commercial speech and the credit
report at issue, but expressly noted that the credit report was not commercial
speech. 472 U.S. at 762 & n.8. In New York Times, the Court held that a paid
advertisement dealing with major civil rights issues did not constitute commercial speech. 376 U.S. at 265-66.
307. For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between direct
regulation and indirect regulation more fully in a later section see infra text
accompanying notes 408-420.

370

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:309

step up from the treatment it historically received. Prior to the
mid-1970s, the Court consistently classified commercial speech
as unprotected by the First Amendment. 30 8 In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,3 0 9 a 1976 decision, the Court partially reversed course and
held that commercial speech deserved First Amendment protection, although not the full measure extended to political speech
and its noncommercial equivalents.3 10
Virginia Board of Pharmacy created a place for commercial
speech in the First Amendment hierarchy, largely because of the
Court's conclusion that society has "a strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information."3 11 The Court also observed
that for certain consumers, the interest in freely obtaining commercial information "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
[their] interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 3 12 Despite this political speech reference, VirginiaBoard of Pharmacy
did not equate commercial and political speech in terms of level
of First Amendment protection. Rather, the Court held that
commercial speech logically merited an intermediate level of
protection, under which the government would enjoy more freedom to regulate than if full protection were the applicable standard.3 13 The Court provided some guidance on the nature of
this intermediate level of protection, by stating that such protection for commercial speech hinged on the expression's being
308. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).

309. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
310. Id. at 770-72. The Court struck down a statute that dealt with the professional conduct of pharmacists. The statute effectively prohibited pharmacists from advertising their prices for prescription medications. Id. at 749-50,
752. Thus, the case presented an instance of direct regulation. See supra note
302. Although Virginia Board of Pharmacywas the first decision in which the
Court expressly held that commercial speech merited First Amendment protection, two cases decided shortly before VirginiaBoard of Pharmacy strongly implied that such a holding was just around the corner. See Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809, 818-22 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
162-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (commenting on the importance of
speech dealing with business and economic matters).
311. 425 U.S. at 764. The Court added that a free flow of commercial information was "indispensable" to the making of private economic decisions in our
free enterprise system. Id. at 765.
312. Id. at 763. According to the Court, consumers' keen interest in receiving commercial information translated into a First Amendment right to receive
such information. Id. at 756-57. This right to receive information formed much
of the basis for the Court's conclusion that commercial speech could not be
wholly excluded from the First Amendment realm. See id.
313. See id. at 770.
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truthful and about a lawful activity.3 14
In an effort to justify its decision not to extend full First
Amendment protection to commercial speech, the Virginia
Board of Pharmacy Court cited certain supposed attributes that
made less-than-full protection more appropriate for such expression. Commercial speech, the Court asserted, is more objectively
verifiable than most political expression.3 15 Moreover, the
Court emphasized that commercial speech is hardier and more
durable than political speech, and thus less likely to be chilled
by government regulation. The Court regarded the profit motive
underlying commercial speech as a force that would likely
pre3 16
deterred.
easily
being
from
speaker
commercial
the
vent
3.

Central Hudson and Early Applications of Four-Part Test

Other than establishing that commercial speech must be
truthful and pertain to a lawful activity in order to merit protection,3 17 VirginiaBoard of Pharmacydid not specify many details
regarding the intermediate level of protection and its application. In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,3 18 the Court adopted a four-part test intended to
314. Id. at 771-72. In other words, false commercial speech receives no First
Amendment protection; nor does commercial speech about an unlawful activity.
It should be remembered, however, that the Court's Virginia Board of Pharmacy ruling arose in the direct regulation context. For explanation of this article's use of the term "direct regulation," see supra note 302. Courts should not
follow this same approach to false commercial speech in the indirect regulation
context. See infra text accompanying notes 408-420.
In the noncommercial setting, the Court treats false statements and statements about unlawful matters much differently than it does when dealing with
commercial speech. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270-73 (1964) (falsity does not necessarily cause loss of First Amendment protection for speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (expression
about unlawful activity remains protected by First Amendment unless expression is both directed to incite and likely to incite imminent lawless action).
315. 425 U.S. at 771-72. This proposition is debatable. See supra note 252.
316. Id. This is also debatable, especially when the focus shifts from the
direct regulation context of Virginia Board of Pharmacy,see supra note 304, to

the indirect regulation setting of a damages action. As this Article will show, a
potentially substantial damage award may have more of a chilling effect than
the threat of remedies available in the direct regulation context. See infra text
accompanying notes 410-418. Although the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court
referred to the presence of a profit motive, the Court reaffirmed elsewhere in
the opinion that the desire for profit does not in and of itself cause fully protected speech to lose that character. See 425 U.S. at 761-62.
317. See id. at 771-72. The indirect regulation setting warrants a different
approach, however. See infra text accompanying notes 408-420.
318. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson presented another direct regulation case in the sense noted at supra note 302. The case centered around a state
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supplement Virginia Board of Pharmacy and govern the First
Amendment analysis of government restrictions on commercial
speech.
The Central Hudson test's first element is a threshold inquiry designed to determine whether any First Amendment protection is available. It specifies that: (1) the affected
commercial speech must pertain to a lawful activity and be nonmisleading.3 19 Satisfaction of this element3 20 entitles the expression to First Amendment protection. Because the First
Amendment provides only intermediate protection, however, the
Court will uphold the government regulation if the remaining
elements of the Central Hudson test are satisfied: (2) the government has a "substantial" underlying interest to further with
regard to the regulation; (3) the regulation directly advances
this underlying interest; and (4) the regulation is no more exten321
sive than necessary to further the government interest.
These elements focus on the nature and strength of the government's supporting interest (element two), and on the degree
of "fit" between that interest and the particular regulation at issue (elements three and four).3 22 Although later decisions have
modified the test in certain respects, it remains the rule that if
the government regulation does not satisfy elements two
323
through four, the regulation violates the First Amendment.
Under the intermediate level of protection enunciated in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and refined in Central Hudson, it
always remained possible that even truthful commercial speech
about lawful matters could undergo significant government regulation without any First Amendment transgression occurring.
The Supreme Court's first decade of commercial speech deciPublic Service Commission regulation that restricted promotional advertising
by utility companies. Id. at 558.
319. Id. at 566.
320. If the commercial speech refers to an unlawful activity or is misleading,
the remaining elements become moot because the government action will not be
held to violate the First Amendment. See id. As Virginia Board of Pharmacy
made plain, the First Amendment does not protect (in the direct regulation setting, see supra note 314) commercial speech that misleads consumers or promotes an unlawful activity, see VirginiaBoard of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771-72.
321. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566. But see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989), which effectively altered the final element of the Central
Hudson test. See infra text accompanying notes 337-343.
322. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Fox, 492 U.S. at 475, 479-80.
323. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Fox, 492 U.S. at 475. Fox and
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) modified
the content and application of the Central Hudson test. For discussion of
Posadasand Fox, see infra text accompanying notes 330-343.
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sions following Virginia Board of Pharmacy nonetheless revealed a tendency to take a dim view of government attempts to
restrict commercial speech that was neither false nor designed
to promote unlawful pursuits.3 24 The Court struck down, for instance, restrictions on attorneys' ability to advertise, 3 25 utility
companies' freedom to promote the service they provided, 3 2 6 and
contraceptive sellers' mailings of unsolicited promotional
3 27
materials.
The Court, in its early commercial speech decisions, exhibited considerable concern for the relationship between the underlying government interest and the regulation under reviewthe degree of "fit" issue which Central Hudson's final two elements contemplate. More often than not, careful attention to
those elements revealed an insufficiently close relationship between the regulation and the government interest,3 28 because
the regulation either was unlikely to advance the interest in any
meaningful way or swept too broadly, restricting more expression than necessary
to further the government interest just as
3 29
effectively.
324. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637
(1985); Bolger v. Youngs Drug. Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363
(1977); Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749, 750-52 (each striking
down restrictions on non-misleading speech about lawful activities).
325. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 637; Bates, 433 U.S. at 363.
326.

CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561.

327. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68.
328.

See, e.g., id. at 60, 71-75 (1983); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67.

329. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug. Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71-75
(1983); CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67. In Bolger, the Court struck down a
federal statute that barred unsolicited mailings of contraceptive advertisements. 463 U.S. at 75. Because the non-misleading advertisements promoted
the legal sale of contraceptives, they merited no First Amendment protection
under Central Hudson's first element. The Court concluded that the government could not override this protection because the minimal degree of fit between the statute and the governments underlying interest failed Central
Hudson's final two elements. Id. at 71-75. Even though the Court acknowledged that the government possessed a substantial interest in helping parents
in deciding when to discuss contraception with their children, the Court determined that the statute's sweeping ban would do very little to further this interest and was excessively broad. See id. Bolger also presented a threshold issue:
whether the contraceptive advertisements constituted commercial speech or
fully protected noncommercial expression. The advertisements' noncommercial
aspects included their statements on the uses of contraceptive devices to prevent pregnancy and minimize the risk of venereal disease transmission. According to the Court, the speaker's economic motive often strongly indicates the
expression's commercial nature. Id. at 66-67. This statement must be considered in the context of designing advertisements to promote the sale of a commercial product. Id. at 75. Outside that context, the mere presence of an
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4. Weakening of Four-Part Test?
The Court's more recent commercial speech decisions, however, reflect greater tolerance of government restrictions on
truthful commercial speech about lawful activities. In Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,330 the Court upheld
Puerto Rico's prohibition of certain commercial advertisements
for casino gambling, a legal activity in Puerto Rico. 33 1 Applying
Central Hudson's third and fourth elements, the Court did not
conduct the careful analysis, manifested in previous decisions,332 of the degree of fit between the advertising ban and the
government's underlying interest. The Court instead deferred
to Puerto Rico's legislative judgment that the regulation directly
advanced the government's interest in a way no more extensive
than necessary.3 3 3 After noting that the legislature would not
have enacted the advertising ban if it did not consider the restriction an appropriate means of advancing the interest in protecting its citizens from casino gambling's harmful effects, then
Justice Rehnquist indicated that it would be inappropriate for
the Court to interfere with this "reasonable" legislative
33 4
judgment.
By authorizing a deferential approach to the final two elements of the Central Hudson test, Posadas weakened the test
despite purporting to adhere to it. Such deference will likely allow more government regulation of commercial speech to withstand constitutional attack than would the independent judicial
3 3 5 In a later case, Board
analysis undertaken prior to Posadas.
underlying economic motive does not necessarily render the expression commercial in nature. See supra note 304. The Bolger Court concluded that if
speech contains some political aspects but appears predominantly commercial,
it should be treated as commercial speech entitled only to an intermediate degree of First Amendment protection. 463 U.S. at 67-68.
330. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
331. Id. at 330-31, 344.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 324-329.
333. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 341-44. For additional discussion of the deferential approach taken in Posadas, see Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court
and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MI-N. L. REv.

289, 292, 301 (1987).
334. 478 U.S. at 341-44.
335. Compare the deferential approach of Posadas,id. at 341-44, with the
cases cited at supra note 324 (each of the latter reflecting an apparently great
willingness to view commercial speech restrictions skeptically). Posadas did
not stop at an apparent alteration of the Court's application of CentralHudson's
third and fourth elements. After deeming the advertising before the Court constitutional because it passed the four-part test, the majority outlined (in an
opinion authored by Justice, now Chief Justice, Rehnquist) an alternative anal-
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of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,33 6 the

Court followed the lead of Posadasby expressing approval of its
deferential approach 33 7 and relaxing CentralHudson's final element, which requires the government regulation to be no more
extensive than necessary to further the underlying government
interest. 3 38

Conceding that language in previous decisions

might have indicated that this element mandated a "least-restrictive-means" analysis, Justice Scalia stated that Central
3 39
Hudson neither contemplated nor required such an analysis.
The Court chose a different path in Fox, holding that this
final element merely requires that the government regulation of
commercial speech be "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective."3 40 Justice Scalia noted that the First Amendment requires only a "reasonable" fit, "not necessarily [a] perysis with potentially significant implications for First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist asserted that because Puerto Rico would have had
the power to ban casino gambling, it should logically possess the power to take
the less intrusive step of allowing casino gambling but prohibiting certain advertising promoting it. 478 U.S. at 345-47. This dictum could justify a broad
range of restrictions on commercial speech if seized upon in future cases, because there are few underlying activities that the government could not constitutionally ban. See Lively, supra note 333, at 300. According to the Posadas
dissenters, Justice Rebnquist's analysis was backwards. The dissenters asserted that in terms of constitutionally protected freedoms, the advertising ban
would be more drastic than a ban on the underlying activity because the activity, unlike the advertising, carries no constitutional protection. 478 U.S. at 354
n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). So far, the Court has not invoked the Posadas
dictum again. There is of course no guarantee, however, that the Court will not
play it as a constitutional trump card in some future commercial speech
decision.
336. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
337. See id. at 479-80.
338. See supra text accompanying note 321.
339. Fox, 492 U.S. at 475-80. The Court labelled prior references to a leastrestrictive-means approach as dicta, because the Court had never formally held
that a government restriction on commercial speech must be the absolutely narrowest means of furthering the applicable government interest in order for the
restriction to withstand First Amendment attack. Id. at 477, 480.
340. Id. at 480. Fox arose out of a state university regulation which operated to prevent private parties from holding "Tupperware parties" in students'
dormitory rooms. The student plaintiffs maintained that this application unconstitutionally deprived them of their rights to receive commercial speech. For
discussion of the right to receive commercial information, see supra note 314.
The Fox trial court ruled for the university. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded because the trial court had not determined whether the regulation
was the least restrictive means by which the university could have furthered its
substantial interests in preserving a sound educational environment and in
protecting students from unscrupulous merchants. The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded because the court of appeals erred in requiring
the "least restrictive means" analysis. 492 U.S. at 471-82.
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fect" fit, between the regulation and the underlying government
interest.3 41 After Fox, therefore, a regulation that is more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest-and
thus constitutionally infirm under Central Hudson-may now
be held not to violate the First Amendment. A restriction that
sweeps more broadly than the narrowest possible regulation
may still be reasonably suited to the advancement of the government interest.
Fox's "narrowly tailored" approach requires only
342
the latter.
Fox's relaxation of the four-part test necessarily means that
courts will be less likely to strike down government restrictions
on commercial speech on First Amendment grounds than they
would have been during the era preceding Fox and Posadas.
This in turn translates into a probable lessening, although not
an elimination, of the First Amendment protection given to commercial speech. 3 43 For purposes of this article, however, it is
useful to recall an earlier caveat: the Supreme Court developed
its commercial speech doctrine in the context of direct government regulation of advertising, and has not resolved the issues
surrounding indirect regulation through private parties' legally
authorized suits for damages. 3 44 The indirect regulation setting-the setting section 43(a) cases present-implicates interests that call for only a partial acceptance of, as
well as
3 45
modifications to, current commercial speech doctrine.
VI.

INADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FIRST
AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS IN SECTION
43(a) "DEFAMATION" AND "INJURIOUS
FALSEHOOD" CASES

The relative youth of the new section 43(a) means that
courts have not yet had an abundance of opportunities to address the First Amendment issues associated with the "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" claims now actionable under the
341. Id. at 480.
342. See id. at 476-80.
343. The Fox Court declined to acknowledge that it reduced Central Hudson's severity. The Court instead maintained that Fox only clarified the degree
of scrutiny to be given to government action that restricts commercial speech.
Id. at 480-81. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that the decision strengthened "the essential protections of the First Amendment" by maintaining a clear distinction between the respective levels of protection given to
commercial and noncommercial expression. See id. at 481.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 301-307.
345. See infra text accompanying notes 408-420.
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statute. Regrettably, however, the opportunities that have
arisen have not been exercised effectively. The problem stems
partially from the longstanding view that as to false advertising
claims, the former version of section 43(a) created a strict liability regime under which fault requirements and other First
Amendment principles were not essential to proper judicial resolution.3 46 That view, not particularly objectionable when the
claim stems from the defendant's false statements about its own
products or services, 3 4 7 has carried over into judicial construction of the newly amended version. 348 Application of the same
strict liability approach, however, has become considerably more
troublesome now that the statute allows suits based on a defendant's statements about the plaintiff's products, services, or com3 49
mercial activities.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia350 is the leading case addressing the First Amendment's
proper role in "commercial defamation" claims brought under
the new section 43(a). There, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
highlighted the relevant issues and concerns, but resolved them
in a fashion that was unsatisfactory not only for the matter at
issue but also for future section 43(a) cases. 3 51 Unfortunately,
other courts have not attained even this imperfect level of
analysis.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
347. It may safely be presumed that the defendant would nearly always be
in a strong position to determine whether statements about the defendant's
own product or service are factually supportable. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to maintain-as the strict liability approach under the former § 43(a)
seems to-that a defendant speaks at his, her, or its peril when stating falsehoods about the defendant's product or service. A strict liability regime, when
confined to the defendant's false statements about the defendant's product or
service, is justifiable on another ground: the probable lack of a chilling effect
resulting from such a regime. It is doubtful that a rule of strict liability would
deter an advertiser from commenting on his, her, or its own product or service
in advertisements. The same would not necessarily be true, however, of an advertiser's comments about a competito's product or service. See infra text accompanying notes 402-407, 414-420.
348. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia,
898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990); Energy Four, Inc. v.
Dornier Medical Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
349. For discussion of the present § 43(a)'s allowance of such claims, see
supra text accompanying notes 65-100. This article's proposed First Amendment framework for such cases appears at infra text accompanying notes 399461.
350. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990).
351. See infra text accompanying notes 374-390.
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A. THE U.S. HEALTHCARE DECISION
1. Factual Background and Third Circuit's Rationale
U.S. Healthcare arose from a "comparative advertising
in which Blue Cross, an insurance company, and U.S.
war"
Healthcare, a health maintenance organization, each extolled
the virtues of its own health coverage while commenting unfavorably on the other's services and commercial activities. U.S.
Healthcare ("USH") sued Blue Cross, raising several state law
claims including defamation, injurious falsehood, and interference with contractual relations, as well as a federal claim under
section 43(a). Blue Cross counterclaimed on the same legal theories. The trial judge granted Blue Cross's motion for post-trial
judgment on USH's claims; the jury found for USH on Blue
Cross's counterclaims. 35 3 The trial judge classified each party
as a public figure whose burden it was to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the other party possessed actual malice. Neither party satisfied its burden, however. 35 4 Concluding
that the trial court had adopted an erroneous analytical frameCircuit Court of Appeals reversed and
work, the 5 Third
3 5
remanded.
The Third Circuit analyzed the various alleged falsehoods
cited by the parties to determine which were actionable. It concluded that each competitor had stated injurious falsehood and
section 43(a) claims insofar as the other's advertisements inaccurately detailed its competitor's health plan. Moreover, the
Third Circuit held actionable, under section 43(a), certain advertisements in which Blue Cross allegedly misrepresented features of its own coverage.3 56
In addition, the court determined that defamation and section 43(a) claims existed in favor of USH based on certain Blue
Cross advertisements. These advertisements suggested that
primary care physicians affiliated with USH's health maintenance organization possessed a financial interest in not referring patients to specialists, and that USH took reprisals against
primary care physicians who made many such referrals.3 5 7 Ac3 52

352. U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 917.
353. Id. at 918-20.
354. Id. at 920.
355. Id. at 939.
356. Id. at 926. The court held other statements in the parties' advertisements to be non-actionable puffing. Id. at 925-26. For the court's discussion of
the elements of a § 43(a) claim, see id. at 921-22.
357. The court observed that these statements were "capable of defamatory
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cording to the court, the advertisements implied that "U.S.
Healthcare, the people who run it, and the doctors who are employed by it, all place personal profit above adequate health
care,"3 58 and thus "suggest[ed] reprehensible conduct by U.S.
Healthcare and its employees in the conduct of their
business." 35 9
The Third Circuit also determined that Blue Cross was entitled to pursue defamation and section 43(a) claims based on a
USH television commercial depicting a Blue Cross brochure
resting on a hospital bed pillow. 3 6 0 During this depiction, while
a narrator outlined the shortcomings of Blue Cross coverage, a
pair of hands pulled a sheet over the Blue Cross brochure and
the camera panned to grieving family members standing around
the bed. The Third Circuit observed that "the depiction of a distressing death scene in a health insurance commercial [was not]
an uncalculated association."3 6 1 The court noted that USH intended "a scare tactic" which a jury could regard as suggesting
provides health care so substandard
that Blue Cross "knowingly
36 2
as to be dangerous."
The Third Circuit then turned to First Amendment issues,
stating that they would be resolved identically under each of the
actionable defamation, injurious falsehood and section 43(a)
claims. 3 63 Because the case arose in the comparative advertising context, the court found it necessary to reconcile defamation's constitutional aspects with the diminished constitutional
status of commercial speech. 3 64 It observed that "[i]n the context of government restriction of speech, false and misleading
commercial speech have no First Amendment value."3 6 5 Nonetheless, the court noted, the First Amendment does protect some
false and defamatory statements.3 6 6 Moreover, the Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had placed a First
meaning." Id. at 926. It also noted that "Lanham Act claims may lie." Id. at
927.
358. Id. at 926.
359.

Id.

360. Id. at 926-27.
361. Id. at 927. This observation notwithstanding, the court did not require
a knowing falsehood (or any similar fault requirement) as an element of a
§ 43(a) "commercial defamation" claim. See id. at 921-22.
362. Id. at 927. Nevertheless, the court did not require a knowing falsehood
(or any similar fault requirement) as an element of a § 43(a) "commercial defamation" claim. See id. at 921-22, 937.
363. See id. at 931.
364. See id. at 927-30.
365. Id. at 928 n.15.
366. Id.
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Amendment premium on speech dealing with matters of public
constitutional protection in
concern by affording it "heightened
367
the defamation context."
According to the court, "the subordinate valuation" of commercial speech should not be confined to the line of cases dealing
with direct government regulation of advertising.3 68 The Third
Circuit classified the advertisements at issue as commercial
speech, under the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions
defining the term. In doing so, it stressed the advertisements'
profit-driven promotion of products and services.3 69 Relying primarily on the Dun & Bradstreetplurality's use of the commercial speech analogy,3 70 the Third Circuit concluded that the
USH and Blue3 71Cross advertisements rose only to the level of private concern.
The Third Circuit stated that even though USH and Blue
Cross might arguably have been public figures, the trial court
erred in invoking defamation law's public figure doctrine and actual malice requirement. Regarding the public figure approach
as not only inapplicable but unworkable in the case's commercial setting,3 72 the Third Circuit held that "while the speech
here is protected by the First Amendment,... the First Amendthan that manment requires no higher standard of liability
3 73
dated by the substantive law for each claim."
2. Analysis of the Decision
In U.S. Healthcare, the Third Circuit clearly made a
thoughtful attempt to reconcile seemingly inconsistent First
Amendment doctrines. It correctly rejected the trial court's
First Amendment approach to those issues; the case's commercial origins made the public figure actual malice doctrine unsuitable.3 74 The rationale the Third Circuit ultimately adopted,
367. Id. at 929.
368. Id. at 932. Contra National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc.,
793 F. Supp. 627, 645-48 (D.Md. 1992) (in defamation case, constitutional fault
requirements should not be altered even if defendant's statements were made
in context of commercial speech).
369. U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 933-36.
370. 472 U.S. 749, 762 & n.8, 763 (1985).
371. U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 930-32.
372. Id. at 937-39.
373. Id. at 937.
374. The public/private figure distinction is not well-suited to commercial
cases, in which corporations are often the plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes 194-198. But see National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc.,
793 F. Supp. 627, 640-43 (D.Md. 1992) (rejecting argument that public/private
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however, was just as unsatisfactory as the trial court's.
The Third Circuit's approach in U.S. Healthcareeffectively
equated commercial speech with speech of only private concern. 3 75 In taking this approach, however, the court unduly relied on a misreading of Dun & Bradstreet. Citing Dun &
Bradstreet's commercial speech analogy, the U.S. Healthcare
court asserted that if credit reports are matters of only private
concern, then commercial speech should nearly always be of pri3 76
vate concern.
Dun & Bradstreet did not hold, however, that all credit reports are of private concern, only that the particular credit report at issue-one with an extremely limited circulation-was of
private concern. 37 7 Justice Powell's plurality opinion allowed
for the prospect that certain credit reports could be of public concern. The rationale adopted in Dun & Bradstreetindicates that
an allegation of bankruptcy, if made in a widely circulated credit
report, would likely be of public concern.3 78 The advertisements
in U.S. Healthcarewere very widely circulated,3 79 a fact that undercuts the Third Circuit's conclusion that they were of only private concern. Moreover, in drawing the commercial speech
analogy in Dun & Bradstreet,Justice Powell noted that he was
not labelling credit reports as commercial speech.38 0 Thus, even
though the particular credit report involved in the case received
the private concern designation, Dun & Bradstreet cannot stand
for the proposition that commercial speech is necessarily of only
private concern.
Although the Third Circuit did acknowledge that commer38
cial speech might occasionally be classified of public concern, '
figure distinction should not be applied in defamation cases brought by corporate plaintiffs). Moreover, as will be seen, an actual malice standard effectively
bestows full First Amendment protection. See infra text accompanying notes
425-427. Commercial expression, of course, receives only an intermediate level
of protection. See supra text accompanying notes 308-313.
375. See 898 F.2d at 931 & n.20, 932-37.
376. See id. at 931-32. The court initially seemed to allow for some chance
that commercial speech might sometimes be of public concern. See id. at 932
n.21. The court's later analysis effectively eliminated this prospect, however.
See infra text accompanying notes 381-390.
377. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 76163 (1985).
378. Id. at 762 n.8.
379. The parties' advertisements appeared on television and radio and in
the print media. 898 F.2d at 918-19.
380. 472 U.S. at 762 n.8. For additional discussion of the commercial speech
analogy used in Dun & Bradstreet,see supra text accompanying notes 247-257.
381. U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 932 n.21, 933 n.24.
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it rendered that acknowledgement-already too grudging in nature-virtually meaningless when analyzing the advertisements
at issue. Despite citing references in the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions to the considerable importance of a free
flow of commercial information, 3 2 the Third Circuit gave short
shrift to this important First Amendment interest. It stated
that the offending advertisements dealt with health care issues
yet labeled the
of considerable public interest and significance,
38 3
advertisements as matters of private concern.
These inconsistencies stem from the difficulty of the First
Amendment issues in cases of this nature. They also reflect the
U.S. Healthcare court's failure to appreciate that a finding of
public concern does not inescapably lead to full First Amendment protection for the expression. The court correctly noted
the Supreme Court decisions indicating that an advertiser cannot convert otherwise commercial speech into fully protected
noncommercial expression by simply referring to noncommercial
issues of broad social significance.38 4 The Third Circuit missed
the point, however, when it cited those cases. The references to
important public health care issues did not convert the offending
advertisements into noncommercial expression. Instead,
although the court failed to realize it, those references and subject matter made the commercial speech 38 5 of public, rather
than merely private, concern. Correctly emphasizing why the
advertisements could not constitute fully protected noncommercial expression, the U.S. Healthcarecourt cited-but simultaneously missed the effect of-factors that entitled the
advertisements to a greater degree of First Amendment protection than the court ultimately allowed.38 6 Although commercial
382. Id. at 931 n.20, 933 n.24.
383. See id. at 935-37. The advertisements dealt with "the quality, availability, and cost of health care." Id. at 937. The court acknowledged that these
issues "are among the most important and debated issues of our time." Id.
384. See id. at 936-37, 939.
385. The court correctly labelled the advertisements commercial speech.
The parties designed advertisements to promote their respective health care
plans, see id. at 917-19, and to therefore fall within the classic commercial
speech definition of expression that "propose[s] a commercial transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
386. Despite the expression's commercial nature, the court should have recognized that the speech implicated a matter of public concern. The health care
issues explored in the advertisements, major social issues facing our society,
warranted the public concern classification. See 898 F.2d at 917-19. As the
court itself acknowledged, issues such as the "quality, availability, and cost of
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speech of public concern does not merit full First Amendment
protection, it is entitled to a meaningful level of constitutional
accommodation.
Furthermore, even if it had been correct that the commercial speech at issue was of only private concern, the Third Circuit nonetheless failed to provide adequate First Amendment
protection. Dun & Bradstreet,on which the Third Circuit relied
so heavily, did not hold that speech of private concern lies
outside the First Amendment's scope. Instead, the Supreme
Court's message was that the First Amendment does protect exalbeit to a lesser degree than speech
pression of private38concern,
7
of public concern.
The Third Circuit conceded that the speech at issue, which
it correctly labelled commercial and incorrectly labelled of pri3 8 8 It imvate concern, "is protected by the First Amendment."
mediately negated this conclusion, however, by adding that "the
First Amendment requires no higher standard than that mandated by the substantive law for each claim."3 8 9 If considered in

light of "the substantive law" of section 43(a), this statement effectively contends that although the speech affected by the statutory claim for damages merits First Amendment protection,
that protection is adequately provided by a strict liability standard and a set of damages rules allowing substantial damages
without rigorous proof requirements.3 9 0 So viewed, the statement borders on the nonsensical. A more meaningful First
Amendment approach, proposed below, is obviously in order.

B. OTHER

DECISIONS UNDER THE NEW SECTION

43(a)

Other courts encountering the First Amendment implications of section 43(a) false advertising cases 3 9 1 have not demonhealth care are among the most important and debated issues of our time." Id.
at 937. For additional analysis revealing why the advertisements in U.S.
Healthcareshould have been classified within the public concern realm despite
their commercial nature, see infra text accompanying notes 440-451.
387. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 760.
388. U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 937. With this statement, the Third Circuit seemed to recognize that in the indirect regulation context, falsity in the
commercial expression should not forfeit all First Amendment protection. See
infra text accompanying notes 408-420.
389. 898 F.2d at 937.
390. For discussion of§ 43(a)'s strict liability scheme, see supra text accompanying notes 37-41, 85-100. The damages rules in § 43(a) cases are discussed
at supra note 53. Similar problems attend the common law of defamation. See
supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
391. Sometimes, of course, courts have not had occasion to reach the First
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strated anything approaching the level of scrutiny the Third
Circuit applied in U.S. Healthcare. Accordingly, those courts
have provided little to help sharpen and harmonize the relevant
freedom of expression doctrines at issue.
For instance, Energy Four,Inc. v. DornierMedical Systems,
Inc.,392 involved competing suppliers of electrodes for lithotripsy
machines. The court preliminarily enjoined each party from
making false statements about its own, or the other's, product.3 93 The court's analysis of the defendant's First Amendment
argument consisted solely of its observation that the statements
deserved no protection because they were untrue commercial
speech, and such speech "disserves the aims of the first amendment."3 94 As suggested by the court's struggle in U.S. Healthcare, not to mention the considerable discussion elsewhere in
this article, the First Amendment issues in section 43(a) "commercial defamation" cases are not so readily disposed of as the
Energy Four court believed.
Other courts have simply ignored-whether deliberately, in
order to avoid complicating the case, or unintentionally-the implications of the new section 43(a)'s allowance of "commercial
defamation" claims. These courts merely recite essentially the
same elements required by the old section 43(a), without any
mention or consideration of whether the statutory amendment
warrants 3 95First Amendment-based alterations of those
elements.
To their credit, some courts in section 43(a) false advertising
Amendment issues. For example, in American Express Travel Related Serv.
Co. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court concluded that the plaintiffs § 43(a) claim failed because the defendants advertisements were neither false nor misleading. Id. at 790-91. It was thus
unnecessary to address First Amendment issues. In National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court decided
whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded its § 43(a) claim. Id. at 1229-34.
Given the case's preliminary posture, the court may have hesitated to engage in
an in-depth First Amendment analysis. In Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court rejected the plaintiffs § 43(a)
claim because the defendant did not state the alleged falsehoods in the context
of "commercial advertising or promotion." Id. at 141-42. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988). It was therefore unnecessary for the court to consider whether
any First Amendment-based fault requirement should be imposed.
392. 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
393. Id. at 726, 735.
394. Id. at 735.
395. See, e.g., McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d
1544, 1548-49 (2d Cir. 1991); Janda v. Riley-Meggs Indus., 764 F. Supp. 1223,
1227-29 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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cases have shown modest sensitivity to freedom of expression
concerns even if their decisions do not attempt to provide a
workable First Amendment framework. 396 In addition, courts
deciding section 43(a) cases that do not involve false advertising3 9 7 have begun to see that the First Amendment may limit
the statute's sweep.3 98
VII. ACCOUNTING FOR FIRST AMENDMENT
CONSIDERATIONS IN "COMMERCIAL
DEFAMATION" CASES UNDER
SECTION 43(a)

A.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT

REQUIREMENTS

Now that section 43(a) allows suits over a defendant's statements in commercial settings about a plaintiff's products, services, or commercial activities, a blind application of the oncetolerable strict liability approach of the old section 43(a) is
hardly innocuous. Such an approach would allow plaintiffs in
what otherwise would be a defamation or injurious falsehood
case to evade the First Amendment's strictures by restyling the
396. For example, in National Artists Management Co. v. Weaving, 769 F.
Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court failed to require a First Amendmentbased fault element, but did cite freedom of expression concerns as a reason for
not interpreting 43(a)'s "commercial advertising or promotion" language
broadly. See id. at 1231, 1232-35. In ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina
Co., 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court cited First Amendment justifications for ensuring that injunctions granted in § 43(a) cases are sufficiently narrowly tailored. See id. at 971-73, 973 n.16. ALPO Petfoods involved the
defendant's false statements about the defendant's own product. See id. at 96163. The same First Amendment concerns about excessively broad injunctions
should logically apply, however, in cases involving a defendant's false or misleading statements about the plaintiff's product, service, or commercial activities. See infra text accompanying notes 453-455.
397. For discussion of the various uses of § 43(a) other than for false advertising claims, see supra text accompanying notes 22-64.
398. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.,
886 F.2d 490, 493-97 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that First Amendment protected
defendant from liability on plaintiffs § 43(a) claim that defendant's parody of
plaintiffs book summaries created likelihood of confusion as to whether parody
was produced by plaintiff); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-1002 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that First Amendment limits use of § 43(a) for claim that movie
title included plaintiffs name without consent and created likelihood of confusion as to whether movie was about plaintiff or endorsed by her); Ocean BioChem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1552-53,
1553 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that First Amendment protects makers of
movie from liability on plaintiffs § 43(a) claim for trademark infringement).
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action as a section 43(a) claim. That state of affairs would make
neither common nor constitutional sense.
The Supreme Court's defamation decisions verify the constitutional need to insulate some false statements from liability in
order to protect "speech that matters" 9 9 and provide the
"breathing space"40 0 necessary to meaningfully exercise the
First Amendment guarantees of free speech and press. The constitutional aspects of defamation law, as well as the less clearly
defined constitutional aspects of injurious falsehood law, rest on
the fundamental premise that a strict liability scheme creates a
significant danger of a chilling effect. Persons who otherwise
would be inclined to contribute statements, information and
ideas to public debate may engage in self-censorship, even when
their statements would be true, for fear of the liability that
would be readily imposed if the statements were found to be
false. The Supreme Court has recognized this same chilling efrelatively easy access
fect in damages rules that allow plaintiffs
40 1
to potentially large monetary awards.
The interests potentially affected by section 43(a) "commercial defamation" claims do not mirror those involved in state law
defamation claims, because of the latter's availability in noncommercial contexts. 40 2 Nevertheless, the interests are sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that section 43(a)
cannot go unconstrained by the First Amendment. A need to
prevent chilling of expression and provide the necessary
"breathing space" arises in the section 43(a) realm, even though
the expression reached by the statute necessarily occurs in a
commercial context. The Supreme Court's defamation decisions,
and its decisions on direct government regulation of commercial
speech, establish that speech on economic matters is a valued
First Amendment commodity, 403 even when the expression
399. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
400. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
401. For discussion of the chilling effect created by a strict liability scheme
and the potential for large damage awards, see supra text accompanying notes
163-167, 203-212.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 101-115, 125-133, 258-276.
403. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 487-88, 510-11 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 255-276,
298-300, 311-313.
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stems from a commercial setting.40 4
The Court's decisions also demonstrate that the First
Amendment does not stop at protecting speakers' interests. Potentially interested listeners enjoy correlative rights to receive
information on a wide variety of matters about which they are
concerned, including commercial subjects. As the Court has
noted, some consumers may have a significantly greater interest
in commercial matters than in the leading political issues of the
day.40 5 All of this leads to the conclusion that commercial ex404. E.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57, 763-64.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that the form in which expression
appears will not solely determine the expression's First Amendment status (or
lack thereof). Instead, the expression's substance achieves a greater importance than its form. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265-66 (holding that even
though expression at issue appeared in form of paid advertisement, it was fully
protected expression rather than then-unprotected commercial speech). For additional discussion of this aspect of New York Times, see supra text accompanying notes 159-161, 257-259; supra notes 160-161. See also National Life Ins. Co.
v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 644-45 (D. Md. 1992) (recognizing
substance-over-form notion as applied in New York Times).
This focus on substance should be carried over to the § 43(a) realm. Assume, for illustrative purposes, that a non-competitor of the plaintiff makes a
false statement about the plaintiff's business activities. Also assume that the
statement gives rise to a defamation claim (but not a § 43(a) claim, due to the
lack of a "commercial advertising or promotion" setting) in which a First
Amendment-based fault requirement would arise. If a competitor of the plaintiff states the same thing-i.e., the same substance-in a setting governed by
§ 43(a), the competitor should not lose all First Amendment protection simply
because of the surrounding commercial setting. Of course, the competitor merits less First Amendment protection than the non-competitor because of the
commercial setting in which the competitor made its statement, but this commercial context should not wholly deprive the competitor of all First Amendment protection. See infra text accompanying notes 408-439.
The facts of Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc.,
738 F. Supp. 1499 (D.S.C. 1989), resemble those in the above hypothetical. In
this pre-new § 43(a) case, the plaintiff sued a competitor and members of the
media for defamation after the defendants alleged that the plaintiff engaged in
deceptive merchandising practice. Id. at 1501-03. After classifying the plaintiff
as a public figure, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove actual malice. If Sunshine
Sportswear had arisen under the present § 43(a), the competitor defendant
would likely have faced a § 43(a) claim because he arguably made the statements about the plaintiff while promoting his business. The media defendants
would still have escaped defamation liability due to the plaintiffs inability to
prove actual malice. The competitor defendant, who served as the media defendants' source, would have been at risk of liability, however, under § 43(a)'s
strict liability approach. Besides reflecting too little focus on the substance (as
opposed to the form) of expression, this scenario illustrates the incongruity of
having a First Amendment-based fault requirement in defamation law but not
having one under § 43(a).
405. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 756-57, 763-64.
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pression is "speech that matters."40 6 Accordingly, First Amendment-based requirements must supplement section 43(a)'s
40 7
literal language in the false advertising context.
B.

REJECTION OF DIRECT REGULATION CASES' TREATMENT OF

FALSE OR MISLEADING COMMERCIAL SPEECH

The First Amendment-based requirements proposed below
would allow the makers of some commercial falsehoods to escape
section 43(a) liability.40 8 This might seem inconsistent with one
aspect of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine: the
rule that misleading commercial speech, as opposed to its truthful, partially protected counterpart, receives no First Amendment protection. 40 9 The apparent inconsistency disappears,
however, when one considers the significant differences between
the direct regulation context in which the Court's commercial
speech decisions arose and the indirect regulation presented by
section 43(a) cases. As discussed below, the difficult First
Amendment issues associated with section 43(a)'s "commercial
defamation" claims cannot be adequately addressed by uncritical resort to the treatment of false or misleading commercial
speech in the direct regulation context.
As used here, the term "direct regulation" refers to government regulation, usually by statute or agency rule, which proscribes expression of a certain content or subject matter. In
addition, the term contemplates the government as the enforcing actor, proceeding directly against the alleged violator in a
civil, administrative, or even criminal, proceeding. Available
remedies typically include injunctive, restitutionary, or adiministrative relief.
"Indirect regulation" refers to instances in which the government, by statute or common law, authorizes private parties
to bring civil suits for damages when a defendant allegedly violates the statute or common law rule. Although an arm of the
406. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
407. This means that even though Congress made efforts to account for
First Amendment concerns by restricting § 43(a) "defamation" claims to the
commercial context, see supra text accompanying notes 94-100, those efforts fell
short of the mark.
408. See infra text accompanying notes 421-439.
409. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447

U.S. 557, 566 (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). For discussion of the

Supreme Courts commercial speech decisions, see supra text accompanying
notes 301-345.
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government-the judicial system-gives effect to these legal
rules when it decides such cases, the government's enforcement
role is more circumscribed than in the case of direct regulation.4 10 In this context, the direct enforcing actor is the private
plaintiff. The term "indirect regulation" does not signify, however, that such regulation's effects on commercial speakers are
insignificant. Indirect regulation's consequences, including a
potential chilling effect, may often exceed those of direct
regulation.
The Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions, which
held that the First Amendment protects only true commercial
speech, all arose in the direct regulation context. 4 1 ' In that setting, denying First Amendment protection to false commercial
speech becomes acceptable because direct regulation will generally be narrowly tailored. 4 12 The government regulation will
likely reach only the specific falsehood, without consequences for
the truthful components of the commercial speech. Indeed, the
government could constitutionally regulate the truthful portions
only if the regulation satisfied Central Hudson's test for evaluation of commercial speech restrictions. 4 13 Moreover, a regulation allowing injunctive relief against a specific commercial
falsehood or an administrative remedy directed toward the
falsehood will not likely deter the motivated commercial speaker
from returning the next day with truthful commercial statements. The same cannot be said of indirect regulation, however.
In the indirect regulation context presented by section
43(a)'s authorization of civil damage actions, an award of damages due to an instance of false advertising will not always be
narrowly tailored. 4 14 Although a falsehood triggered the award,
the advertisement almost certainly included true statements as
well. The true statements may have contained information of
4 15
value to readers, hearers, or viewers of the advertisement.
410. There is, however, sufficient government involvement to satisfy the
state action requirement of the First Amendment. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
411. See cases cited and discussed at supra text accompanying notes 301345.
412. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (requiring that
restrictions on commercial speech in the direct regulation context be "narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired [governmental] objective").
413. For explanation and discussion of this four-part test, see supra text accompanying notes 317-345.
414. Cf. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (requiring that restrictions on commercial
speech be "narrowly tailored to achieve the desired [governmental] objective").
415. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (expressing
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The damage award, however, effectively subjects the accurate
and valuable information to the same consequences as the falsehood. This will most likely occur when the damage award is
large in relation to the defendant's financial resources and the
defendant thereafter concludes that advertisements-even
those featuring true, informative statements-do not justify the
"cost." In other words, the false advertising damage award may
have a significant chilling effect.
Furthermore, the threat of a possible 43(a) damage award,
as well as the costs associated with defending against even an
unmeritorious suit, may deter the prospective commercial
speaker from running advertisements. This chilling effect
would seem especially likely to limit the prospective advertiser's
inclination to use comparative advertisements, 41 6 which tend to
arouse its competitor's ire. An irate competitor may lodge a section 43(a) claim if an objectionable comparison contains a statement of "fact"41 7 that the competitor alleges to be false or
misleading. If the chilling effect occurs, the deterred commercial
speaker does not suffer the First Amendment loss alone. Other
"losers" are those members of the public who would have benefited 4from
true and informative statements never brought to
light. 18
The foregoing differences between the direct regulation context of the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions and
section 43(a)'s indirect regulatory scheme demand a rejection, in
the latter context, of the former's treatment of false or misleading commercial speech. For purposes of section 43(a)'s "commercial defamation" claims, courts must afford false or misleading
commercial speech an intermediate level of First Amendment
420
protection, 4 19 in order to protect "speech that matters."
concern about defamation rules that allow potential for overly large damage
awards); cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57, 763-64 (1976) (discussing value of commercial information and consumers' rights to receive such information); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(commenting on importance of statements on business and economic matters).
416. See Singdahlsen, supra note 37, at 342, 364-65, 382-83.
417. For discussion of the false statement of fact requirement under § 43(a),
see supra notes 58-105.
418. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 756-57 (discussing consumers' rights to receive commercial information).
419. This intermediate level would be comparable to that established for
non-misleading commercial speech in the direct regulation cases discussed at
supra text accompanying notes 301-345.
420. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); cf. National
Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 645-48 (D. Md. 1992)
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PROPOSED FIRST AmENDMENT FRAMEWORK

It is now time to confront the fundamental issue addressed
by this article: the nature and form of the First Amendment restrictions which courts should require for section 43(a) "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" claims. A convenient, but
unsatisfactory, conclusion would be to act as some courts in the
injurious falsehood context have done, and engage in wholesale
borrowing of the First Amendment framework the Supreme
Court has fashioned for defamation cases. 4 2 1
The commercial context in which section 43(a) cases necessarily arise demands, however, a different First Amendment
analysis. The appropriate standard should recognize commercial speakers' freedom of expression interests without losing
sight of an essential concept: that the First Amendment protects commercial expression to a lesser degree than noncommercial expression. 42 2 Defamation and injurious falsehood law have
often glossed over this concept. 42 3 Courts should not make the
same mistake when "constitutionalizing" section 43(a). 42 4
1.

Proof of Fault

Although the commercial expression giving rise to section
43(a) "defamation" or "injurious falsehood" actions merits some
constitutional accommodation, it does not justify the blind appli(holding that in defamation case, constitutional fault requirements should not
be altered even if defendant's statements were made in context of commercial
speech).
421. For discussion of judicial attempts to accommodate First Amendment
considerations in injurious falsehood cases, see supra text accompanying notes
277-289; supra notes 283-284.
422. Section 43(a) "commercial defamation" claims necessarily involve commercial expression. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (requiring that statement
giving rise to suit must have been "in commercial advertising or promotion").
For discussion of the different levels ofFirst Amendment protection extended to
commercial and noncommercial expression, see supra text accompanying notes
290-313.
423. See supra text accompanying notes 194-198; see also Langvardt, supra
note 3, at 962-63, 968-69 (discussing importance of paying greater attention to
distinction between commercial and noncommercial expression in injurious
falsehood cases).
424. The First Amendment framework proposed below focuses primarily on
a fault requirement and the need to draw a public/private concern distinction
within the realm of commercial speech. See infra text accompanying notes 425451. A preliminary component of a suitable "constitutionalization" of § 43(a),
however, should be judicial adoption of a narrow construction of the promotion
language in the statute. Such a construction is outlined at supra notes 78-79.
In particular, courts should reject the questionable interpretation apparently
advanced by Sen. DeConcini. See supra note 79.
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cation of defamation's actual malice requirement. The actual
malice requirement's stern nature frequently makes it outcomedeterminative in public figure plaintiff cases. It is extremely difficult to prove by even a preponderance of the evidence-let
alone clear and convincing evidence-that the defendant made
the statement at issue with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.4 25 This burden effectively equates the
4 26
actual malice standard with full First Amendment protection
and provides defamation defendants with quite favorable odds
against liability. Although commercial expression merits First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court's commercial speech
cases illustrate that it deserves a lesser degree than the actual
malice requirement provides.
Thus, section 43(a) "commercial defamation" cases also warrant a First Amendment standard less demanding than actual
malice. Moreover, the inappropriateness of engrafting the actual malice rule upon section 43(a) means that little reason exists to extend defamation's public/private figure distinction to
section 43(a) cases. The Supreme Court developed that distinction in cases involving human plaintiffs and noncommercial settings; it is poorly suited to cases involving corporate plaintiffs in
commercial contexts.4 2 7 A more workable approach for false advertising cases avoids an expenditure of judicial energy on the
often elusive status-of-the-plaintiff inquiry 4 28 by focusing on the
speech at issue and applying an understandable fault
requirement.
In order to more suitably reflect commercial speech's intermediate level of First Amendment protection, all plaintiffs in
section 43(a) "defamation" or "injurious falsehood" cases should
be expected to prove negligence on the defendant's part.4 29 This
425. For discussion of the actual malice requirement and its usual effect in
defamation cases brought by public official and public figure plaintiffs, see
supra text accompanying notes 182-186.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 184-185, 294-295.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 194-198; supra note 198.
428. For further discussion of the difficulties associated with making public
figure determinations in cases brought by business entities, see generally
Fetzer, supra note 197.
429. Of course, some false advertising claims brought under § 43(a) may be
based on the defendant's false statements about the defendanfts own product,
service, or commercial activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). For reasons
noted earlier, the strict liability approach traditionally followed under § 43(a)
would remain appropriate for such claims. See supra note 347. When some of
the statements giving rise to a § 43(a) suit are about the defendant's product,
service, or commercial activities, and other statements giving rise to the same
suit referred to the plaintiffs product, service, or commercial activities, the neg-
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requirement would be satisfied by showing that the defendant
failed to use the degree of care a reasonable person would have
exercised, under the circumstances, to ascertain the truth or falsity of the statement before making it. Private figure plaintiffs
generally must meet a similar negligence standard in defamation cases. Courts are already familiar with this readily under430
standable concept.
As a fault requirement, negligence poses a considerably less
severe burden than does the actual malice standard. 43 1 Negligence effectively provides an intermediate standard that falls
between the polar extremes of actual malice and strict liability.
A rule requiring all plaintiffs to prove negligence would suitably
accommodate a defendant's legitimate, although not compelling,
First Amendment interest in commercial expression, without
amounting to constitutional overkill.
2.

Standard of Proof as to Fault

The public concern doctrine, now a mainstay of First
Amendment jurisprudence, 43 2 is also relevant in section 43(a)
litigation. As previously demonstrated, commercial speech may
encompass subjects of both public and private concern. 4 3 3
Although commercial speech protection never rises above an intermediate level, commercial expression of public concern
should logically receive somewhat greater protection than does
commercial expression of private concern. 4 34 A suitable First
Amendment framework for section 43(a) "commercial defamation" cases must therefore incorporate these varying degrees of
First Amendment protection.
An appropriate implementation would require the plaintiff
to prove negligence by clear and convincing evidence in a section
ligence requirement should apply only as to the latter statements. The negligence requirement should also apply as to any § 43(a) claim-triggering
statement that simultaneously refers to the plaintiffs and defendant's respective goods, services, or business activities.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 201-207.
431. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45, 347-48, 350
(1974).
432. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 756-63 (1985). For discussion of Dun & Bradstreet'sinjection of a public
concern element into the constitutional aspects of defamation suits brought by
private figure plaintiffs, see supra text accompanying notes 221-254.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 254-276, 375-390, 400-407.
434. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 758-60 (indicating that speech on
matter of public concern is more highly valued for First Amendment purposes
than is speech on matter of private concern).
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43(a) "commercial defamation" case involving a statement of
public concern. If the offending statement rose only to the level
of private concern, the plaintiff would merely need to satisfy the
normal preponderance of the evidence standard. Although the
clear and convincing evidence standard has never been a model
of clarity, it is nonetheless reasonably familiar to courts by virtue of its long4 35use in defamation cases applying the actual malice standard.
Escalating the usual standard of proof on the negligence issue provides a useful means of extending somewhat greater protection to commercial expression of public concern. At the same
time, commercial expression of private concern would still receive meaningful protection by virtue of the negligence requirement.43 6 As a result, the public/private concern distinction
would not assume an "all-or-nothing" significance in terms of the
resulting First Amendment protection. Avoiding such all-or435. When the actual malice requirement applies under defamation's constitutional aspects, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 174-176, 184.
436. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-60 (noting that even though
speech on matters of public concern is more highly valued under First Amendment, speech on matters of private concern does not go unprotected by First
Amendment). In an earlier article dealing with the First Amendment aspects of
injurious falsehood, I asserted that the plaintiff should not be expected to prove
fault in an injurious falsehood suit brought against a competitor defendant
whose statement was commercial in nature and dealt with a matter of only
private concern. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 974-75. Although that assertion differs from the proposal made in the text for § 43(a) "commercial defamation" cases involving expression on matters of private concern, a sound reason
exists for the difference. Injurious falsehood law has traditionally included a
requirement that the plaintiff prove special damages as a substantive element
of the claim, thereby, making many injurious falsehood cases difficult to win.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-124. The stern special damages requirement, although a common law element, would have the dual effect of providing competitor defendants adequate protection (for First Amendment
purposes) against liability when their commercial speech is of private concern.
A fault requirement, therefore, would be unnecessary in that configuration of
injurious falsehood case. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 974-75. But see id. at
973-74 (proposing fault requirement of negligence in injurious falsehood case
against competitor defendant whose commercial expression was on matter of
public concern). Section 43(a) cases, however, do not carry a special damages
requirement of the sort found in injurious falsehood. Judicial approaches to the
awarding of damages in § 43(a) cases are more liberal than the injurious falsehood approach. See supra note 53. Moreover, unlike the rule in injurious falsehood cases, § 43(a) plaintiffs may win their suit and obtain injunctive relief
without proof of any actual harm. See supra note 52. The absence of a special
damages requirement as a check against § 43(a) liability leads to the conclusion
that a fault requirement is necessary in order to provide defendants some level
of First Amendment-based protection in "commercial defamation" cases involving statements on matters of private concern.
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nothing consequences is particularly appropriate when the underlying characterization will likely be a close call, as the public/
private concern determination will often be, and an erroneous
determination results in7 either far too much or far too little con43
stitutional protection.
3.

Making Public/Private Concern Determinations in Context
of Commercial Expression

When the Supreme Court, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders,Inc., emphasized the importance of "public
concern" in defamation actions, it provided only the unenlightening "content, form, and context" test for distinguishing between matters of public and private concern. 4 38 A meaningful
application of the section 43(a) fault rules proposed earlier demands that this test be supplemented by explicit factors and detailed considerations. The factors suggested below 4 39 will at
least sharpen the focus when courts deciding section 43(a) "defamation" or "injurious falsehood" cases must determine whether
commercial expression is of public or private concern. In making that determination, courts should consider:
1.

statement pertains to a matter of public
Whether the defendant's
4 40
safety or public health;

437. For example, in U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990), the Third Circuit
struggled with the question whether the commercial speech at issue was of public concern. The court ultimately-and erroneously-concluded that the expression was of private concern even though it dealt with major health care
issues of considerable public interest and debate. Id. at 930-32, 937-39. For
explanation of why the court's conclusion was incorrect, see supra text accompanying notes 375-387. As a result of this close-to-the-line (and erroneous) determination, the expression at issue effectively received no First Amendment
protection, notwithstanding the court's assertion that § 43(a)'s strict liability
approach somehow provided meaningful First Amendment protection. See 898
F.2d at 937; supra notes 388-390. If the Third Circuit had resolved the difficult
public concern/private issue by holding that the expression was of public concern, the court evidently would have imposed a fault requirement or devised
some other means of providing meaningful First Amendment protection for the
expression. See 898 F.2d at 929, 937.
438. 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
439. In the immediately following list of factors relevant to a determination
of whether § 43(a)-triggering commercial expression was of public concern or
private concern, I have drawn upon a similar list of factors in an article in
which I proposed First Amendment requirements for cases brought under the
common law of injurious falsehood. See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 965-68 &
nn.351-61. I also relied upon the same portions of the earlier article for various
comments in infra footnotes 440-446, which accompany the factors listed in the
text.
440. Questions of public safety and health present logical candidates for
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2. Whether the
defendant's statement pertains to one of life's essen4 41
tial needs;
the
3. Whether the consuming public frequently and extensively uses
4 42
product or service referred to in the defendant's statement;
4. Whether the defendant's statement pertains to a product, service,
44 3
or commercial activity that the government regulates heavily;
5. Whether the defendant's statement alleges the commission of a
public concern treatment, given the obvious societal significance of such issues.
See U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d at 935-37 (statements regarding health care issues may be of considerable public interest and debate) see also Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 75657, 763-65 (1976) (considerable public interest in matters such as prescription
drug prices); Machleder v. Diaz, 617 F. Supp. 1367, 1373, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(allegations about dumping of chemical wastes are of public concern in invasion
of privacy case), affd in partand rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987). But see U.S. Healthcare,898 F.2d
at 937 (concluding incorrectly that commercial nature of expression converted it
to expression of private concern).
441. Food, water, and other essentials of life are of such profound importance that allegations regarding them may qualify for the public concern classification. See, e.g., Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220,
230 (N.J. 1986) (statements on chlorine content of bottled water are of public
concern in case brought on defamation and injurious falsehood grounds); Steaks
Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 1980) (allegations regarding meat quality are of public concern in defamation case). This should not
mean, however, that public concern treatment would be automatic for all statements connected in some sense to an essential of life such as food or water. The
other factors set forth in the text would still need to be considered in light of the
precise content and nature of the allegations themselves.
442. It seems reasonable to assume that in general, the likelihood of public
concern increases if the statement deals with a frequently used product or service rather than a product or service whose extent and frequency of use are
limited. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485 (1984) (statements tending to falsely describe stereo speakers' performance apparently were of public concern); see supra note 272. Under this
factor, it would become important to consider the number of actual and potential users who could be affected if the product or service were as falsely depicted
in the defendant's statements.
443. If the government actively regulates the product, service, or commercial activity discussed in the defendant's statement, the government's relationship to such matters would seem likely to make the statement a candidate for
public concern. Whether public concern treatment would be appropriate in a
particular case would depend upon the nature and extent of the relevant government regulation. See, e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publishing, Inc.,
793 F. Supp. 627, 634 (D. Md. 1992) (significant government regulation of insurance business is among reasons why allegation regarding financial instability of insurance company is of public concern); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442
F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (significant government regulation of insurance companies and issuance and sale of securities makes insurance company public figure about which statements are of public interest). Cf. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 & n.8 (1985)
(holding that allegation of bankruptcy in credit report at issue was of only private concern, but appearing to concede that certain allegations of bankruptcy
may be of public concern).
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criminal act;44 4
6. Whether the defendant's statement alleges the commission of an
unethical act;4 45
statement was widely circulated and
7. Whether the defendant's
446
often repeated.

In a broad range of defamation and injurious falsehood decisions analogous to section 43(a) cases, one or more of the above
factors served as a basis on which courts expressly or impliedly
attached the public concern label to the expression at issue. The
list is admittedly tentative, preliminary, and almost certainly
not all-inclusive. Courts will likely find supplementation necessary as they proceed beyond the infancy of section 43(a) "commercial defamation" claims. Because the factors are designed to
give greater substance to the "content, form, and context" test
and thereby aid the making of the public/private concern determination, the factors need not all point toward the same conclusion. When different factors suggest different possible results
on the public/private concern issue, courts will have to decide, in
light of all the relevant circumstances, which factors weigh more
heavily in the balance.
Application of these factors would likely result in a determination of public concern status for a great deal of, although not
all, commercial speech-a result consistent with the Supreme
Court's defamation and commercial speech cases. 44 7 Those who
444. Allegations of criminal behavior deal with matters of undoubted public
concern, according to various Supreme Court defamation decisions. See, e.g.,
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 32-34, 41-43 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 135-36 (1967); see also Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 755-56 (noting that
each of the Court's previous defamation decisions involved statements on matters of public concern).
445. Given recent years' calls from various quarters in society for a renewed
emphasis on ethical behavior, statements alleging unethical individual or corporate acts should be likely to receive the public concern label. See, e.g., Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988) (allegation that tobacco company adopted advertising strategy designed to induce minors to begin smoking); Turner v. Welliver,
411 N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 1987) (allegation of unethical insurance practices).
446. In a general sense, a widely circulated or often repeated statement
would have a greater tendency to be of public concern than would an unrepeated statement of very limited circulation. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at
762 & n.8 (noting limited circulation of expression as being among facts leading
to conclusion that expression at issue was of private concern). Once again, however, the other factors already discussed must also be considered in order to see
whether the generalization just expressed is in fact borne out in a particular
case.
447. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
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argue that this result overvalues commercial expression must
recall a lesson evidently forgotten in U.S. Healthcare: affording
certain commercial speech public concern status does not
threaten to transform that expression into a fully protected
equivalent of noncommercial expression.448 Even commercial
speech of public concern enjoys no more than intermediate First
Amendment protection.44 9
4.

Injunctive Relief and Damages

This article has not attempted, other than by way of background description, to examine the specific requirements for obtaining injunctive relief and damages for a violation of section
43(a). 4 50 A comprehensive First Amendment framework, however, requires some examination of the extent to which the prevailing approaches to granting injunctive relief and awarding
damages raise freedom of expression concerns.
Courts have construed section 43(a)'s "likely to be damaged"
language as authorizing a virtually automatic injunction when a
proper commercial plaintiff proves that the defendant's advertisement contained a false or misleading statement.4 5 ' In contrast, defamation law very seldom has allowed injunctive relief,
with injurious falsehood law being slightly more receptive to
that remedy.4 52 Commercial speech's diminished degree of First
Amendment protection will not shield the defendant from injunctive relief that is narrowly tailored. 45 3 To be narrowly tailored, the injunction should prohibit only those statements
found to violate section 43(a), rather than indiscriminately
sweeping in other statements that were in the same advertisement but did not contribute to the false or misleading
U.S. 485, 487-88, 510-11 (1984); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-64 (1976); Curtis Publishing,
388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes
254-276, 298-300, 311-313.
448. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898
F.2d 914, 930-37 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 (1990). For additional discussion of this forgotten lesson, see supra text accompanying notes 384-386.
449. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 756-57, 763-65, 770.
450. See supra notes 51-53.
451. See supra note 52.
452. See KEETON et al., supra note 2, § 128, at 928, 971; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
453. Cf. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (restrictions on
commercial speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve desired governmental
objective).
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impression. 4 54
Moreover, the negligence requirement proposed earlier
should apply regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks injunctive
or monetary relief. Uniform application would go a long way toward alleviating First Amendment concerns about the present
approach's arguably lenient granting of injunctive relief.4 5 5
Although the Lanham Act neither allows punitive damages
45 6
nor follows the common law's presumed damages doctrine,
the probable chilling effect of damage awards-actual or
threatened-in section 43(a) false advertising cases warrants
concern. This chilling effect 4 57 stems from some courts' recent
tendency to take a loose approach to proof of damages under section 43(a). Such an approach relaxes, but does not wholly eliminate, the plaintiffs burden of proving damages in order to obtain
a monetary recovery. Under a relaxed burden allowing greater
flexibility in both the means of proving damages and the permissible items of damages, the potential for large damage awards
increases. 4 58 Critics of the present trend argue that this potential has been realized too often in recent years. 45 9 Although this
trend in section 43(a) cases cannot be fully equated with defamation's common law rule of presumed damages, the same potential chilling effect that prompted the Supreme Court to limit
the presumed damages doctrine 4 60 requires a judicial toughening of section 43(a)'s proof of damages rules. This article, however, leaves the appropriate details to able commentators who
have focused more carefully on remedies issues arising under
4 61
section 43(a).
454. See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 971, 973
n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
455. See supra notes 51-52.
456. For discussion of the presumed damages doctrine in the common law of
defamation, see supra text accompanying notes 111-115. The damages rules in
§ 43(a) cases are discussed at supra note 53.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 208-212, 410-420.
458. For discussion of judicial approaches to the awarding of damages in
§ 43(a) cases, see supra note 53.
459. See, e.g., Singdahlsen, supra note 37, at 364-65, 393-94.
460. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). For discussion of Gertz's effect on the availability of presumed damages in defamation
cases brought by private figure plaintiffs, see supra text accompanying notes

208-212.
461. E.g., Best, supra note 9; BeVier, supra note 9; Frederickson, supra note
51; Heald, supra note 51; Petty, supra note 9; Schechter, supra note 9;
Singdahlsen, supra note 37; Waltzer, supra note 51.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Courts need concrete guidance regarding the proper accommodation of plaintiffs' commercial interests and defendants'
freedom of expression interests in "defamation" and "injurious
falsehood" cases brought under section 43(a). The statute's
broadened range of prohibited falsehoods and the inevitable upsurge in falsehood-based commercial litigation triggered by the
new section 43(a) make the issue one of considerable
importance.
Judicial interpretations of the pre-"commercial defamation"
version of section 43(a) provide little help in this regard. Decisions under the new version also reflect inadequate accommodation of emerging First Amendment concerns. Moreover, the
difficult freedom of expression issues associated with section
43(a) "commercial defamation" claims cannot be satisfactorily
resolved by uncritical resort to the treatment of false or misleading commercial speech in the context of direct government
regulation.
The strict liability approach apparently contemplated by
the literal language of section 43(a) ignores the significant freedom of expression interests that gave rise to First Amendmentbased requirements in defamation and injurious falsehood law,
undervalues the speech at issue in section 43(a) cases, and insufficiently considers the consumer's constitutional entitlement to
receive information on a broad range of commercial subjects.
Nonetheless, because section 43(a) "commercial defamation"
claims limit themselves to commercial speech, it would be inappropriate to engage in a wholesale adoption of the identical First
Amendment framework devised by the Supreme Court for state
defamation law.
A proper accommodation of First Amendment interests requires that all plaintiffs in section 43(a) "defamation" and "injurious falsehood" cases prove negligence on the defendant's part.
The section 43(a) plaintiff would satisfy this requirement by introducing sufficient proof that the defendant failed to use the
degree of care a reasonable person would have exercised, under
the circumstances, to ascertain the truth or falsity of the statement before making it. If the commercial expression giving rise
to the claim is of public concern, courts should require the plaintiff to prove the negligence element by clear and convincing evidence. The normal preponderance standard would suffice on the
negligence element if the commercial expression is only of private concern. The making of the sometimes difficult public con-
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cern/private concern determination would be aided by
consideration of the various factors outlined in this article. As
litigation under the new section 43(a) increases, courts may also
find it necessary to revise their present approaches to granting
injunctive and monetary relief in order to minimize the potential
chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms.
When Congress enacted the present version of section 43(a),
it apparently sought to minimi.e First Amendment concerns by
limiting the statute's breadth to commercial expression. As this
article has demonstrated, Congress failed in that well-intentioned effort. Judicial adoption of the framework set forth
herein would be a substantial step toward remedying the First
Amendment problems created by the language of the new section 43(a).

